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Foreword 
 
This research focuses on the act of making, based on, and conducted through, 
parts of my design praxis. In this I have been interested primarily in two, 
interrelated aspects: the designer as an anthropologist—design as the 
knowledge of societies; and the designer as a craftsman—design as the 
knowledge of how to put things together. I understand both of these activities 
as instances—makings—where statements are produced and transmitted. My 
attention has been on:  
 What statements are involved in the act of making?  
 How and why are these statements produced? 
 How and by what are these statements transmitted and maintained? 
 How and why do these statements bring together object, languages, and 
bodies as well as activities, phenomena, and ultimately societies? 
 
As a practical underlay for the research, I have created and framed eight 
different design laboratories—here presented as individual works. These 
laboratories are instances (in my existing portfolio) where I have framed, found 
and/or unearthed structures of statements; as well as new instances where I have 
created and transmitted statements. Common to all the design laboratories is the 
element of full-scale exploration in which research has been done through the 
very act of making, rather than through merely representing or observing 
makings.  
 
This research has been conducted from two ends, sometimes carelessly called, 
practical and theoretical. Subsequently, I have created this document as two 
separated but interconnected publications; similar to how the different sides of 
this research are seen to complement and reflect each other, the two 
documents seek to create an inseparable whole. They are cross-referential: in a 
reading of one of the documents it is the intention that the contra part serves 
as a reference.  
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This text Design as Systems of Knowledge is an attempt to build a theoretical model, 
a model aimed to situate and define my research. I see my writing as an 
essential part of my praxis. It is a way for me to reflect my praxis in other 
praxes and to draw benefits from others’ discoveries. It is, however, not an 
attempt to build a generic design model, nor is it an attempt to make a theory 
about theory. In this, the creation of the model takes on a similar 
miscellaneous attitude as I have towards any tool of design; i.e., I have 
borrowed examples, cases, concepts, and terminologies from a number of 
fields and instances. The usage, or misusage, of these examples, cases, 
concepts, and terminologies have helped me to define and understand my own 
endeavors of making.  
 
Design as Systems of Knowledge is divided into three parts: Part I – Makings; Part II 
– the Player Piano, and Part III – Creativity. In Part I – Makings, I attempt to 
define what kind of transmissions of statement are involved in design praxes—in 
acts of making. By the end of Part I, I arrive at a theoretical diagram that has 
been crucial for my understanding of my work. This diagram seeks to bring 
together statements of objects, languages, and bodies into a comprehensive 
model. In Part II – the Player Piano, my focus has been on how the transmissions 
of makings are maintained and how statements can be thought to 
interconnect and interlink to other statements. In this part, I am touching on 
societal aspects of making. Finally, in Part III – Creativity, I am conjecturing 
around how and why these structures of statements have come about. The 
exploration in this part attempts to clarify findings in my own praxis as well as 
in other praxes, findings that I believe have underlying psychological 
explanations. The interest here is consequently how and why we, as humans, 
can make. Albeit the research presented in Design as Systems of Knowledge is, as 
stated, based on my own praxis, it is my hope that this work is somewhat 
generic and useful for fellow makers.  
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Makings of Makings  
 
The act of making is ubiquitous in human societies, and it is a common factor 
in all design disciplines. The concept of making can be expanded to envelop 
related concepts, such as construction, modeling, shaping, creating, producing, 
and building. In the organization of the research a tier structure of increasing 
complexity became apparent:  
 
1. makings (daily life) 
2. makers of makings (design)1 2 3 4 
3. makers of makers of makings (design teaching)5 6 7 
4. makings of makings of makers of makings (design schools)8 
 
The increasing complexity of the tier structure derives from an increasing 
depth of the network in which the makings are thought to take place; i.e., how 
is a specific making related to social and corporeal structures? 
 
 
                                                 
1 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Bre[a]king Making Chair.” 
2 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Platå Bar.” 
3 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Sports Jacket.” 
4 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Piecemeal Meal.” 
5 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Anthropolog[y]ists.” 
6 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Crafts[men].” 
7 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Broken Horizon.” 
8 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, On Bamboo.” 
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The first tier is the one-to-one making. These are the makings we do in our 
daily lives. We make and remake artifacts, typefaces, clothes, food, and we 
make our beds. The English language even acknowledges social acts as 
makings, such as making an entrance, making friends and making love. In 
some respect making also has a semiotic connotation in that we, in reading 
signage, can make sense, make connections, and I am right now making 
these arguments. Furthermore, as individual bodies we are made. This 
understanding of the makings of bodies operates on different levels. We are 
talking about the creation (making) of man in a genetic and religious sense.  
Parents are also seen as active in the making of babies. We can build (make) 
skills as well as the body itself—bodybuilding.  
 
As craftsmen and anthropologists, designers can be seen as makers of 
makings. Design provides subtexts and contexts for makings—corporeal 
(i.e., products, objects) and social (i.e., communication, services, meeting 
places). For example, the door, which we can make an entrance through; the 
tool that makes the door; the chair we sit on; the constellations of chairs and 
tables where different social interactions take place, are all makings that we 
can call designs. They are makings of social acts, and, as such, they go beyond 
the objects involved. They affect all the bodies as well as the language involved 
in the acts. These linkages among bodies, languages, and objects involved in 
making are important to note. I will come back to them later. As a teacher of 
design, I am also a maker of makers of makings. I am, hopefully, preparing 
Figure 1.  
Happy young men from 
the village of Labu Tale, 
Papua New Guinea are 
returning from a two-day 
trip carrying special wood 
for traditional Melanesian 
outrigger canoes. They 
told me that every man is 
to make at least one 
canoe during his lifetime. 
 
Figure 2.  
Car repair in Havana, 
Cuba.  
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my students with the right methods, techniques and tools for their makings of 
makings. In this respect, the design teacher is sending knowledge by the 
building of the student’s skills. Finally, when one starts to think about creating 
bigger situations for education—creating design schools—we are really talking 
about makings of makings of makers of makings.  
 
I am not trying to be cute here by creating long, quasi-poetic sentences. The 
core of this study is based on understanding the communication of knowledge 
between the tiers of making. I really believe that we have something to gain 
from understanding how the system of knowledge and the didactic (pedagogic) 
processes of design operate herein. The work has been guided by a belief that 
there are fundamental principles to be uncovered, principles that operate 
similarly regardless if we are discussing a one-to-one daily making or a 
making of makings of makers of makings. These principles construct a 
rulework by which not only design but also societies operate.  
 
How is knowledge passed on between the tiers of makings? How do 
makings generate and maintain products and services? How do objects shape 
our societies? How do societies shape objects? What fabricates and keeps 
societies together? The interest is what constitutes the of’s in the sentence 
“makings of makings of makers of makings” as well as the making itself. The 
of’s are crucial in order for social cultural acts to operate. It is in the instance 
between the tiers of makings (the of’s) where we find some important cultural 
packing and unpacking taking place. However, before we get into the 
discussion of packing and unpacking, let us define: some of the problems we 
might encounter; explore what can be understood as the made; and some of 
the ambiguities this made operates under. 
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Making is Knowledge 
 
  
In Salvador Dali’s 1924 oil painting, The Enigma of William Tell, (figure 3) we see 
a kneeling figure with a protruding butt-cheek. The figure’s extended ass and 
hat are supported by Y-shaped wooden branches. Without the wooden 
branches, the body and the hat would surely fall over, and without the 
disfigured body and odd-shaped hat, the supports would make no sense. The 
painting describes a system in balance. Now we can, of course, ask the 
question of how this system came into balance. Did the bottom grow bigger so 
the support was needed, or did the already existing support allow the 
expansion of the ass? We will never know. What we do know is that the parts  
 
 
Figure 3.  
Illustration ofThe Enigma 
of William Tell, Salvador 
Dali,. 
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seem to coexist in a biologic-like symbiotic system; take one away, and the rest 
will, if not fall, reconfigure. In a very peculiar and beautiful way The Enigma of 
William Tell illustrates the same double take on making that Winston Churchill 
expresses in “We shape our buildings; thereafter they shape us”9 or in Marshall 
McLuhan’s statement “We shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape us.” 
10 
 
                
 
Dali’s painting illustrates primarily the shaping of tools and bodies in a 
corporeal, physiological and physical sense. The body of Tell is, of course, a 
distortion extraordinaire. Therefore, we might dismiss it. However, as an idea, 
Tell’s body is not that odd; we find a similar take on the body-making-object 
in the way we sit in our daily lives. Let us take a look at the symbiotic system 
involved in the Western idea of the chair, the Western way of sitting and the 
Western body’s sitting. This examination links to the explorations done in the 
The Bre[a]king Making Chair. 11 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  House of Commons (meeting in the House of Lords), 28 October 1943. 
10 McLuhan and Lapham, Understanding Media, xi. 
11 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Bre[a]king Making Chair.” 
Figure 4.  
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The act of sitting (on chairs) is not naturally given. It is true that we have a 
bodily disposition to sit. However, how we decide to sit is determined by the 
society in which we were raised. It is societal. Different societies have 
developed different ways of sitting: squatting, lotus position, on low cushions, 
on chairs. Each of these ways activates, strengthens, and shapes different parts 
of the body. Each of these ways activates and involves different objects, such 
as eating tools. The societal way of sitting, moreover, constitutes how the 
individual body in that society develops. It constitutes how muscles, blood 
vessels and ligaments around the feet, knees, and hips are configured. This is a 
process of adaptation to a cultural act by training. In the West, chairs are the 
dominant support for sitting, and, as with Dali’s William Tell, we have shaped a 
body after the support. A culture where chair sitting is all-pervading has 
generated a refigured or disfigured body that cannot operate properly without 
spending a big part of the day sitting in a chair. The same society has, of 
Figure 5.  
The Bre[a]king Making 
Chair, on the faculty 
focus show 2009 
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course, also generated a lot of chairs. The reasons that we do not find our body 
refigured or disfigured are the plentitude of chairs that accommodate the 
body’s need of sitting. However, if an extraterrestrial viewer studied the 
Western chair culture, he or she would have a hard time determining, as in 
Dali’s paintings, if the Western posterior grew bigger so the chair was needed 
or whether the already existing chair permitted the expansion of the Western 
derriere.  
 
The adoption of chairs in our society has not been going on for so long. The 
chair as an all-pervading sitting tool is merely a couple of hundred years old; 
therefore, the adaptation is here not (yet) genetic. However, there are tool uses 
that have had genetic impact. 
 
[W]hen humans hunted big game 100,000 years ago, they relied on 
close-in attacks with thrusting spears. Such attacks were… physically 
taxing, so in those days, hunters had to be heavily muscled and have 
thick bones… But new weapons like atlatl (a spearthrower) and the 
bow effectively stored muscle-generated energy, which means hunters 
could kill big game without big biceps and robust skeletons. The 
Bushmen of southern Africa…are small, tough, lean people less than 
five feet tall. It seems likely that the tools made the man – the bow 
begat the Bushman. (Cochran and Harpending, The 10,000 Year 
Explosion, 3.) 
 
Lactose tolerance is another successful mutation in societies that raise cattle. 
There is a body/object symbiotic relationship; however, in this research we are 
more concerned with shorter time spans than it usually takes for natural 
selection to alter the body. 
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This symbiosis between the sitting body and the chair was one of the departure 
points for the Bre[a]king Making Chair. (figure 5 and 6)The question was, if the 
chair and body are thought of as one symbiotic system, does not the object 
then partly act as a body? Can we imagine a chair that not only supports the 
body but that also gets tired as the body gets tired? By copying aspects of the 
body’s sensory and kinetic system, the link between body and chair is 
strengthened. This chair, which originally was a good representative of the 
category chair, is through usage gradually losing its chairness. It is no longer 
operating as a support for the body, and in the end, the chair would almost 
actively cast off the body. 
 
Furthermore, the reconfiguration of the body by the tools goes beyond the 
visible attributes of the body. The latest neuroscience has shown that the idea 
that “We shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape us” operates in a 
neurological sense, too. Studies on brain waves have shown that infants are 
capable of hearing every existing sound distinction in all the world’s languages. 
However, this ability disappears as the auditory cortex develops. The reason 
that non-native speakers of a language have odd pronunciations is not only 
because of a different figuration of the vocal cords and mouth. If you are not 
raised in the language, your neurologic system actually cannot detect some of 
the sounds.12 This explains why, for example, the Swedish queen, Silvia, born 
and raised in a German-speaking family, still cannot pronounce the U sound to 
                                                 
12 Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself, 298. 
Figure 6.  
the Bre[a]king Making 
Chair. 
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sound remotely like Swedish, as in kung (Swedish for king) or why I, as a native 
Swede, cannot distinguish the difference between W and V, something which I 
share with speakers of German such as The Terminator. However, the 
plasticity of the brain is not only something that happens in early years. 
Successful rehabilitation of stroke victims,13 where lost brain function has been 
redirected to other parts of the brain, shows that the brain is indeed malleable 
even in old age. So we have to think that the body reconfiguration by tools 
works neurologically as well as mechanically; that the brain and our senses, as 
well as the muscles, blood vessels and ligaments, are plastic systems.  
 
And then he saw the buffalo, still grazing lazily several miles away, far 
down below. He turned to me and said, 'What insects are those?'  
 
At first I hardly understood, then I realized that in the forest vision is 
so limited that there is no great need to make an automatic allowance 
for distance when judging size. Out here in the plains, Kenge was 
looking for the first time over apparently unending miles of 
unfamiliar grasslands, with not a tree worth the name to give him any 
basis for comparison...  
 
When I told Kenge that the insects were buffalo, he roared with 
laughter and told me not to tell such stupid lies. (Turnbull, The Forest 
People, 252.) 
 
This episode is told by the anthropologist Collin Turnbull. Kenge, Turnbull’s 
Congolese guide, is here for the first time exposed to an open landscape. 
Living his life in a dense rainforest, perhaps Kenge does not need to develop a 
long-distance depth perception. His interaction in and with the rainforest is 
based on other sensory inputs, like the sense of hearing and the sense of smell. 
Taken out of his habitat, Kenge’s symbiosis between object (rainforest) and 
body (senses) becomes as observable as the behind in the painting of William 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 133–163. 
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Tell. This seems to work the opposite way, too. A body trained in almost 
unlimited visual depth, placed in Kenge’s environment, shows similar sensory 
shortcomings. For example, for a brief time in my life I lived in Papua New 
Guinea.14 In orientating in the dense rainforest, I clearly lacked essential 
sensory understanding of the environment. More often than not, I had to trust 
friends from my village and their sensory skill sets. I understood that it 
required a lot more smelling and hearing than eyesight to find the way through 
the dense jungle. What appeared to me to be an undirected cacophony of 
exotic noises, overwhelming and all-pervading smells of exotic flowers and 
rotting plants, in actuality produced spatial clues and directions for my friends 
on our walks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, On Bamboo.” 
Figure 7.  
A typical path through the 
dense rainforest around 
the village of Labu Tale, 
Papua New Guinea. 
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The interface between body and object (landscape) depends on the set of 
senses involved. The configuration of this set is in this case activated by the 
object (the landscape). This configuration is reflected in the coloration between 
an inner mental world and an outer physical world. The architect Juhani 
Pallasmaa expresses it as: “We dwell in the landscape and the landscape dwells 
in us.”15 The landscape Pallasmaa mentions can be understood as nature as well 
as the man-made.  
 
 
 
The idea of such sensory-object-connections has been instrumental in forming parts 
of my teaching. In a series of investigations—here collected under the design 
laboratory The Making of Crafts[men]16—I have developed students’ explorations 
by navigating the world of stuff and stuff through a world of physical makings. 
These explorations typically take place in the wood workshop and are aimed to 
a direct one-to-one understanding of makings. As craftsman, as maker, the 
designer navigates the world through corporeal operations. Drilling cutting, 
grinding, etc., define a landscape, a landscape where the senses are extended by 
the woodshop’s power tools. 
 
                                                 
15 Pallasmaa, The Thinking Hand, 020.  
Extended quotation: “… the entire world construct by man with its cities, houses, tools and objects, has its 
mental ground and its counterpart. As we construct our self-made world we construct projections and metaphors 
of our own mindscapes. We dwell in the landscape and the landscape dwells in us.” 
16 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Crafts[men].” 
Figure 8.  
Student exploration of 
power tools, from the 
freshmen assignment a 
House for Mister Tool’s 
Tools at VCUQatar  
(Granberg, “The Didactic 
Theater, The Makings of 
Crafts[men]”). 
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Marshal McLuhan describes this ability of a media to become an extension of 
the human senses. In his seminal work Understanding Media: the Extension of Men 
he explores the phenomena of a media to attach and enhance aspects of the 
sensory aspects of the body. The media is indeed an extension of the senses. 
However, the attachments should not be understood as passive. They reshape 
and reconfigure the senses, both at the individual and at a societal level. 
 
Cotton and oil, like radio and TV become fixed charges on the entire 
psychic life of the community. And this pervasive fact creates the 
unique cultural flavor of any society. It pays through the nose and all its 
other senses for each staple that shapes its life. (McLuhan and Lapham, 
Understanding Media, 20.) 
 
McLuhan came from a background of literature; the lion’s share of his 
arguments come from studies of verbal and written knowledge. Therefore, his 
concept can be, and has been, misunderstood as only concerning infotainment 
media, such as newspapers, television and the Internet. Consequently, his 
media discourse can be misconstrued and interpreted as favoring only written 
and verbal communication. McLuhan’s definition of media, however, was 
extremely broad. It includes television, radio, movable type, as well as 
monetary systems, light bulbs, trains, cars, and airplanes. This list can further 
be expanded: Kenge’s rainforest, and the woodshop can be seen as a media; 
and so can the chair.  
 
Place a ring of chairs around a table, and we set the stage for a constitution we 
take for granted in Western democracy—the board meeting. This set stage 
follows the McLuhanesque definition of media. It will direct the bodies involved 
towards the act of the meeting. This configuration will sharpen some senses 
while it will suppress others.  It is an intricate making (of political society) 
constituted by its objects, its language and its bodies. Its objects are obviously 
its chairs and its tables but also pens and pads, glasses of water, etc. These 
objects are additionally entangled in a series of tools and makings. Its 
language, minutes and meeting disciplines govern the meeting as well as 
21 
 
semiotic linkages between bodies and objects, for example, the metonymies; 
the board (of a company or group) and that chair (the leader of the same 
board). Its bodies: are, of course, the chair-sitting bodies (bodies that have 
been shaped by the chair) that get invited into the board meeting. It is a little 
ironic that this seemingly democratic and neutral institution is far from 
democratic and neutral. In its preference of a certain body—the body that can 
sit in chairs—it is excluding anybody else. In international contexts, for 
example the United Nations, we understand the importance of translation 
among the different languages spoken. However, we have little or no 
understanding of the need to translate the environment to the different 
systems of bodies and objects involved.  
 
So, to conclude, makings are not isolated instances: they operates in symbiotic 
systems. In order to understand design from the perspective of how and what 
design as a knowledge transmits, we have to see statements as interrelated; i.e. 
there is no clear separation of foreground and background; and/or object and 
context. Furthermore, it is important to discuss translations involved in 
makings of makings. With that in mind, permit me just briefly to touch upon 
what I see as one of the biggest philosophical obstacles for my design 
thinking—the concept of dichotomies. 
  
22 
 
Finding the Excluded Middle 
 
The body can hardly be understood without the technologies it is applying or 
the environment in which it is operating. In fact, we can understand media, 
nature and technology as forms of knowledge, a knowledge that goes beyond 
the skill-sets of the body—a knowledge that is packed and unpacked through 
the act of making. This is knowledge inherent in objects, things, and artifacts; 
this is the knowledge of stuff and stuff.  In this thinking, the concept of 
knowledge goes beyond something individually required in intentional acts. It 
is not something reduced to solely verbally transmitted communication. 
Instead, it becomes a network of entangled bodies and objects where separate 
parts are different categories of knowledge, parts that, like in the enigma of 
William Tell, are hard to disconnect. 
 
A pile of sand is a heap or not a heap. A man is bald or not bald. A 
number is small or not small. This idea came to permeate Western 
thought as an assumption, the kind of intellectual floor one defends 
instinctively from fear of tumbling into the cellar. Indeed it is settled in 
so deeply that Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and the early 
Wittgenstein accepted it as natural, and GeorgCantor took it for 
granted in creating set theory. (McNeill, Fuzzy Logic-The Revolutionary 
Computer Technology That is Changing Our World, 31.) 
 
I believe that, Western thinking has been, and still is, propelled by the ideas of 
categories and absolute dichotomies—differences between two completely 
opposite ideas or things. Western concepts seem to exist in clearly defined 
divisions such as: nature/culture, modern/traditional, figure/ground, 
body/soul, body (human)/object (non-human), object/language, West/East, 
instinct/knowledge. In my readings I have found traces of this thinking already 
in the classic Greek philosophy, principles of logic. In Aristotle’s principles or 
laws of logic, usually is called the law of contradictions17 and the law of the 
                                                 
17 Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, bk. Metaphysic, Book IV. 
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excluded middle, we find a dichotomist thinking of where absolutes is 
either/or (or on/off). These principles state that things exist in opposite and 
that these opposites cannot contain each other. For example, if cold exists, 
warm must also exist, and cold cannot be warm. By introducing these 
principles, Aristotle was trying to establish a ground for understanding human 
thinking and communication. However, as we are already starting to see, the 
divisions between concepts are highly arbitrary. In fact, there is substantial 
evidence that thinking does not operate with absolute categories, as attempts to 
make thinking machines (artificial intelligence) and findings in experimental 
psychology have shown. Concepts seem to coexist within a sliding scale 
modality. In order to fully understand the media-to-body-double-take and how 
it is related to knowledge, I believe that we have to carry on with a more open 
attitude than we find in the remains of Classical logic. 
 
Post-Aristotelian thinking in the West has always honored the ability to 
break a big topic down to smaller units that are felt to be more be more 
traceable to analysis. This urge to pull apart the subject of analysis, 
whether it is in metaphysics or philology, is so powerful that it alone 
has been granted the honorific adjective systematic”  
(Clark and Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin, 6.) 
 
With this in mind I think we are ready to start do to define what kind of 
transmissions of statement that are involved in design praxes—the act of 
makings of makings.  
24 
 
A Key to Understanding  
 
Let me now continue with a simple act, or making, I have borrowed from the 
anthropologist Bruno Latour18—the act that emerged in old hotels around the 
hotel key, in the old system where a key is attached to a heavy weight. This act 
has now been replaced almost everywhere with key cards. It is, nevertheless, an 
act worthy of our interest since it well illustrates the entanglement of multi-
level knowledge. The hotel wants its customers to leave the key at the 
reception when they are not using their rooms during the day. This generates 
an initial question from the hotel to its guests: Would you mind leaving your key at 
the front desk when you leave the hotel, please? Although the question is polite and the 
requested action does not require a lot of energy, the number of returned keys 
is low. A key is a small object that easily slides into a pocket or a handbag, 
resembling the daily routine of locking the doors of our homes. In the pocket 
or handbag the key is easily forgotten until needed again. Failure to return the 
key is not a consciously mischievous act; it merely mirrors a well-established 
behavioral pattern.  
 
Hotels, therefore, are faced with the question: how can we change the pattern 
of key returns? One solution might be to increase the significance of the 
question by using language that implies urgency, using words like “have to” or 
“need to” in the question. The hotel can, furthermore, increase the significance 
in the message by repetition, using signage reminding the guests virtually every 
step of their stay about the key-returning policy. Or they can employ a 
doorman, collecting keys as the guests leave the hotel. Although this might 
solve the problem, a guard forcing you to return keys would probably send the 
message that: the hotel cares more about its keys than its customers.  
 
One more successful solution for the hotel is achieved by a focus of efforts on 
the object rather than on the language. The hotel attaches the weights to the 
keys and, in a stroke of magic, the guests are beginning to return these keys 
                                                 
18 Bruno Latour, Technology is Society Made Durable, (something’s missing!) 
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willingly. The rules of the game have changed. In order to understand this 
change, we have to understand the communication between hotel and guest in 
a sliding scale of the relation of body, language, and object. Manuel De Landa 
describes it as a “sorting operation”19that structures the social. 20 The weighted 
key cannot be understood merely as a linguistic exercise (although it is part of a 
language game). The weight on the key is both symbolic and non-symbolic. It 
is non-symbolic in that the effect of the weight is physical, factual and 
corporeal: the guest finds it heavy to carry around an extra weight in their 
handbag or pocket. This reaction is due to an object-to-body liaison; it is not a 
learned behavior. The experience springs from the direct meeting between the 
object’s physical weight and the human body’s physiognomic ability to carry. 
The weight operates as knowledge in this act; it triggers a reading—a behavior. 
However, the effect of the weight is symbolic, too, as any key attached to a 
weight can be understood as a hotel key. We can call the key attached to a 
weight a sign in that it starts to stand for, not only itself, but the idea of Hotel 
Key. The study of cultural sign processes is usually called semiotics. Semiotics is 
a huge field that taps into anthropology and that questions how societies are 
communicating internally and externally. Charles Pierce, one of the fathers of 
semiotics, defined a sign as: 
 
[A] sign … is something which stands to somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the 
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or a more developed sign. That 
sign which it creates I call the intreprant of the first sign. The sign 
stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all 
respects, but in reference to some sort of idea, which I have sometimes 
called the ground of the representment” (Peirce, Collected papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, 2:135.)  
 
                                                 
19 Landa and Landa, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, 62. 
20 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Piecemeal Meal.” 
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In the instance the action, returning the key, is truly established, it is done so as 
a double-folded knowledge, the know-how and know-of.  
 
 
 
               
 
Indeed, the moment the hotel guest, now rule-obedient, returns the key there is 
no way to separate Pierce’s representment and object. They have blended in the 
act—in the making. We can see that that object and language have almost the 
same symbiotic relationship as we found in the object-to-body making of 
William Tell. We can call this a system of knowledge in which the making 
becomes the sum of its bodies, languages, objects. None of these entities 
seems to exist in a pure form but in a sliding scale and fused together.  
 
 
Figure 9.  
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In the work with the design lab Platå Bar,21 we found ourselves operating in 
similar symbiotic structures. The focus here was to rethink the entrance 
condition to a Swedish night club, to emphasize elements of courtesy. In Platå 
(figure 11) we choreographed an entrance condition22 as a fragile world of 
glass. In the relationship between the body and the brittle, but aggressive, glass 
a behavior of caution is produced, is communicated. This caution of is 
automatically turned to courtesy of, similar to how the communication of the 
weight of the hotel key produced an action. Thus the communication made by 
the glass tunnel is reliving, or reinforcing, the communication usually made by 
a doorman (guard). We have reason to return to the underlying psychological 
principles of this entrance in Part III.  
                                                 
21 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Platå Bar.” 
22 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Platå Bar.” 
Figure 10.  
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. 
The bar front in glass at 
Platå Bar.  
 
29 
 
What have we have found so far? First, dualisms such as nature/culture and 
genuine/artificial are highly arbitrary; i.e., the boundary between manmade 
(techné) and non-man made (physis) is fuzzy. Second, the division of body and 
object is not clear-cut; i.e., senses and technology have to be seen as fused, 
forming hybrids, cyborgs, and centaurs (we are going to return to this in Part 
III).  Third, the modality of objects and language are operating on a sliding 
scale; i.e., changes of society can be understood as both transformations and 
translations. There are, furthermore, few if any paradigmatic shifts in societies 
where a new media—new technology—exists as a pure new entity; i.e., stages, 
states, and layers of technologies and nature are often superimposed, entangled 
and coexisting. The secluded middle is neither secluded nor middle; it is 
omnipresent. I hope to further support these statements through text and 
laboratories. I believe they are essential in the pursuit of knowledge in design. 
The next step in this pursuit is to explore changes as acts of translation. 
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 Verbal vs. Tacit  
 
A personal memory: When I was a kid, they suddenly changed the titles of the staff who 
cleaned our school. There was an announcement that the title of the cleaning staff 
henceforward was hygiene-technicians (hygientekniker) not cleaning-ladies 
(stadtanter). “Cleaning lady” was conceived of as too derogatory a term, whereas “hygiene-
technicians” was thought to elevate the staff’s status. I can’t remember if there was any 
mention of a salary raise attached to the name switch. However, to us kids it was apparent 
that the staff pretty much executed the same tasks they had done before the name switch. I 
believe that the school, nowadays, is cleaned by “cleaners”—a more gender-neutral term. 
 
In the case of the hygiene-technicians, as well as in the case of the board meeting 
at the United Nations, we saw translation as a rather lopsided act 
preferringlanguage over objects and body. I believe that this reflects a common 
type of thinking, where language and verbal communication are put on a 
pedestal. It is easy to jump to the conclusion that because we express thoughts 
through language thought is language, that language is just a carbon-copy of 
thoughts. However, this is misleading; there are a lot of thoughts that are not 
expressible. Take for instance when you burn yourself on a hot pot. The 
sensation of pain brings about an unconscious reaction (you quickly remove 
your hand), and then a sensation of pain. This sensation is not, however, an 
inner voice shouting, “Pain! Pain! Pain!” In fact, pain is an unspoken sensation. 
The word pain can hardly transmit the sensation of pain between two human 
beings. Or, as the social theorist Elaine Scarry expresses it: “Physical pain does 
not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate 
reversion to a state anterior to language, to sounds and cries a human being 
makes before language is learned.”23   
 
                                                 
23 Scarry, The Body in Pain, 4. 
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The experimental psychologist Steven Pinker expresses it as: “[P]eople do not 
think in English or Chinese or Apache; they think in a language of thoughts”24 
There are plenty of similar thought processes that govern behaviors that 
cannot be described as verbal and conscious at all, for example, the sense of 
balance. The weight of the hotel key in the pocket and the caution of the glass 
of the entrance of Platå are generating behaviors, not primarily verbal, but tacit.   
 
We can see this domination of language and the rational sides that come with it 
deeply rooted into school curricula worldwide, or, as the education expert, Sir 
Ken Robinson, expressed this: “Every education system on earth has the same 
hierarchy of subjects… At the top are mathematics and languages, then the 
humanities, and the bottom are the arts... Truthfully, what happens is, as 
children grow up, we start to educate them progressively from the waist up. 
And then we focus on their heads.”25 These words are vital. In education, less 
                                                 
24 Pinker, The Language Instinct, 72..Extended Quotation:The representations underlying thinking, on the one 
hand, and the sentences in a language, on the other, are in many ways at cross-purposes. Any particular 
thought in our head embraces a vast amount of information. But when it comes to communicating a thought to 
someone else, attention spans are short and mouths are slow. To get information into a listener's head in a 
reasonable amount of time, a speaker can encode only a fraction of the message into words and must count on 
the listener to fill in the rest. But inside a single head, the demands are different. Air time is not a limited 
resource: different parts of the brain are connected to one another directly with thick cables that can transfer 
huge amounts of information quickly. Nothing can be left to the imagination, though, because the internal 
representations are the imagination. We end up with the following picture. People do not think in English or 
Chinese or Apache; they think in a language of thought. This language of thought probably looks a bit like all 
these languages; presumably it has symbols for concepts, and arrangements of symbols that correspond to who 
did what to whom, as in the paint-spraying representation shown above. But compared with any given language, 
mentalese must be richer in some ways and simpler in others. 
 
25 “Ken Robinson says schools kill creativity | Video on TED.com.” format? 
Extended Quote: “Every education system on earth has the same hierarchy of subjects. Every one. Doesn't 
matter where you go. You'd think it would be otherwise, but it isn't. At the top are mathematics and languages, 
then the humanities, and the bottom are the arts. Everywhere on Earth. And in pretty much every system,? too, 
there's a hierarchy within the arts. Art and music are normally given a higher status in schools than drama and 
dance. There isn't an education system on the planet that teaches dance everyday to children the way we teach 
them mathematics. Why? Why not? I think this is rather important. I think math is very important, but so is dance. 
Children dance all the time if they're allowed to, we all do. We all have bodies, don't we? Did I miss a meeting? 
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and less focus is put on any physical knowledge; the same goes for the 
educator of makers. It is in that light the educational design laboratories (The 
Making of Crafts[men], the Broken Horizon, and On-Bamboo) are created. These 
three laboratories aim to bring out multisensory understandings through one-
to-one multisensory makings.  
 
For example, in my work with the Pavilion of the Broken Horizon (figure 12 and13) 
we tried to work from a perspective of a body-to-object relationship. The 
concept of height in the pavilion is primarily communicated through what we 
came to call the dance of the unbalance. This choreography was created through 
experimenting with instances where the visitors of the structure had to let go 
of their grip—the grip of one’s hands, as well as one’s visual and mental grip. 
The idea was that the lack of balance in itself strengthens the concept of being 
above. This bodily awareness is primarily nonverbal.  To achieve this, the 
design process had to be done through full-scale experimentation; the idea of 
unbalance was thus tested by us through dancing, balancing on one-to-one 
prototypes.26 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
(Laughter) Truthfully, what happens is, as children grow up, we start to educate them progressively from the 
waist up. And then we focus on their heads. And slightly to one side.” 
26 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Broken Horizon.” 
Figure 12. 
Unbalance tested by us 
through balancing on 
one-to-one prototypes in 
the Broken Horizon. 
 
Figure 13. 
The final surface of 
unbalance is woven 
together under 
Nebraska’s burning sun. 
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Tacit knowledge is knowledge that cannot be communicated by outwardly 
spoken instructions. In the very title of his book The Thinking Hand,27 Juhani 
Pallasmaa hints of a concept of knowledge beyond what can be broken down 
into only verbal and conscious communication. However, one problem with 
nonverbal knowledge is that it is hard, if not impossible, to express verbally. 
Let us take a short detour into neuroscience to see what a mischievous little 
jester language really can be in trying to prove it is the sole master of thoughts. 
 
We know that our brains are not totally symmetric as far as functions go. The 
two hemispheres of the brain host different faculties. Normally, the left and 
the right hemispheres are well connected, with a broad bandwidth, and the two 
sides communicate fast and constantly. However, in some people, so called 
split-brain patients, the communication is severed. Studies of split-brain 
conditions show a clear compartmentalized differentiation of the two 
hemispheres. Most functions of higher conscious verbal linguistics are located 
in the left hemisphere of the brain where we also find the ability to produce 
verbal sounds, syntactic structures and most of the semantic comprehension of 
meaning. The right hemisphere, on the other hand, is more into understanding 
relationships of reality, relationships that are important for nuances of 
language, such as metaphors and allegories. Furthermore, the right hemisphere 
controls the hand when we express ourselves in drawings. By its ability to 
verbally communicate, the left hemisphere is, however, dominant over the 
mute right. Because our vision connects the right eye to the left and the left eye 
to the right hemisphere, we can in these patients feed the two hemispheres 
independent information.  
 
In another experiment [Doctor Michael] Gazzaniga flashes a chicken 
claw to a split-brain patient’s ‘talking’ left hemisphere and a snowbank 
to the ‘mute’ right hemisphere. The patient draws a snow shovel and 
when Gazzaniga asks him - why he draws a shovel… he says, ‘Oh, that’s 
simple. The chicken claw goes with chicken, and you need a shovel to clean out the 
                                                 
27 Pallasmaa, The Thinking Hand. 
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chicken shed.’ Of course this explanation is completely false. (Christian, 
The Most Human Human, 53.) 
 
 
 
The patient’s explanation might be false; however, it is not a deliberate lie. It is 
just the patient’s verbal rational left hemisphere attempting to make sense; the 
right hemisphere is silent. This episode shows the domination of side on the 
verbal and rational language. 
 
Yet, we have to tread carefully here. A study of brains with defects (in the past 
almost all knowledge of brain function has come about in such studies) has its 
downsides. Today’s more sophisticated methods have enabled us to 
understand the brain under more healthy conditions. The brain is a plastic 
entity. Functions seem to be derived from parallel processes in interconnected 
and combined centers rather than by the mono locus; different centers are 
constantly in connection. We have to take some of the ideas of left-hemisphere-
right-hemisphereness with a large pinch of salt. However, we found the similar 
dominant aspects of language in the case of the cleaning lady are symptoms of 
the same verbal dominance. In fact, today’s society is acting a little like this 
split-brain patient in its mono-channeled concept of knowledge. Luckily for us, 
the verbal side is not the lone analytic power we possess, and, albeit a 
controlling loudmouth, the verbal side does sometimes seem to listen 
Since almost all theory is based on verbal communication, I have a found 
lopsided relationship between not only language and object, but also language 
and body. We tend to understand this in an asymmetric and hierarchical 
relationship where language seems to always drive the train, where translation 
is primarily seen in terms of linguistics. I believe that is far from the truth. The 
translation of a making is to be thought of as: 
 
 corporeal translations: change of the physical relationship between 
objects and body  
 semiotic translation: change of the sign and its meaning 
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I believe that a theoretic design model has to recognize these two modes of 
translation as equals and to find ways of describing them without one level of 
knowledge losing out to the other. In Pierce’s definition of a sign, the sign 
stands for: “that object, not in all respects, but in reference to some sort of 
idea.”28 I believe that this principle can be applied to the knowledge activated 
both by transmissions of sign (language) and by transmissions of stuff and stuff 
(objects). I found this to be accurate, over and over again in my own praxis, as 
well in the study of other praxes. 
 
So what conclusions can be draw out of this? If we understand transmissions 
of making as multi-structural—sendings in more than one channel at the same 
time—we have to be careful when we define our analytical tools so they do not 
give too much importance to one aspect. We have to find a natural model 
where, so to speak, the playing field is leveled; the trenches are filled in; and a 
common ground for meddling between the different aspects is found. In order 
to do so we have to understand the act of makings from fundamental aspects 
of translations and transformations. In the next sections, I attempt to find a 
way to express:  
 what different translations and transformations we would find around 
the act of making?  
 how do these transformations and translations activate the participant 
objects, languages, and bodies? 
These questions ultimately lead up to the theoretical diagram that has been 
crucial for how I understand my praxis.   
                                                 
28 Peirce, Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 2:135. 
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The Knowledge in Stone 
 
 
 
Think of a fist-sized, naturally-shaped piece of rock on a riverbed. We are in 
luck. The forces of the water have shaped it (made it) so it has a rounded edge 
and a sharp edge. Imagine this stone turned into a primitive hammer-like tool. 
In the hands of a human, this piece of nature might be used for a number of 
things, such as cracking open a shell, cutting down a tree or killing an ape.29 
The making of these tools, a hammer, an ax and a weapon, initially can be 
thought of without any alteration of material or shape. We can see these acts as 
acts of translation rather than as acts of transformation or as an activation of 
the stone that translates. This translation is not, however, limited to the 
object—the stone; it is a translation of the body, too. We become Hammer 
Hands, Wood Cutters and Killers. Furthermore, with the tool in hand, the 
world around translates; the perception of the world changes. Envision 
yourself picking up a hammer (the stone) for the first time. Does holding this 
hammer not change your world, your knowledge of the world, the way you 
look at the boundaries and the space? Have the walls not become a little more 
brittle? Have you not become stronger? With a hammer in your hand, the 
world turns into nails. Hasn’t this making given us a new tool, a new body in a 
new world? Similarly, with the band-saw the student sees a new world.30 
 
                                                 
29 Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 22. 
30 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Crafts[men].” 
Figure 14. 
A pair of scissors. 
 
Figure15. 
A piece of paper. 
 
Figure 16. 
A rock. 
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Again this translation works on different levels: corporeal translation and 
semiotic translation. In the corporeal translation the physical relationship 
between objects and body has changed; with the stone in your hand you can 
really cut down that tree now. In the semiotic translation the rock represents 
something beyond itself; the stone becomes a sign, "something which stands to 
somebody for something in some respect or capacity.” 31 The stone is a 
hammer, an ax, or a weapon (held by a Hammer Hand, a Cutter, or Killer), and 
it represents all hammers, axes or weapons.  
 
The Italian semiotician and author, Umberto Eco, describes this act of 
translation as: 
 
When Australopithecines used a stone to split the scull of a baboon, 
there was yet no culture, even if an Australopithecine had in fact 
transformed an element of nature into a tool, we could say that culture 
is born when: (i) a thinking being established the new function of the 
stone (irrespective of whether he works on it, transforming it into a 
flint stone); (ii) he calls it “a stone that serves for something” 
(irrespective of whether he calls it so to others, or out loud); (iii) he 
recognizes it as “the stone that responds to the function F and that it 
has a name Y (irrespective of whether he uses it as such a second time: 
it is sufficient that he recognize it). (Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 22.) 
 
Eco describes a translation—the stone as a tool—which clearly cuts through a 
pure nature/culture dichotomy. When the stone is used, it could be easily 
tossed back into the riverbed where it translates back into the pure piece of 
nature it once was. The stone is therefore both man-made and non-man-made. 
Our interest here is how does the man-made part work?  
 
If we go back to part of Eco’s statements (i) and (iii) that a thinking being 
established the new function of the stone and that he recognizes it as “the 
                                                 
31 Peirce, Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 2:135. 
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stone that responds to the function F…,” 32 it is, once more, easy to think that 
this is a purely semiotic act, an act where only a language emerges. However, 
the thinking that establishes the new function that the stone responds to does 
not have to be expressed aloud. The action is recognized and stored away, 
memorized mostly as a sensory-motoric act. This is often called muscle memory and 
must be thought of as a combination of different faculties in the body. The 
brain reconstructs itself from input of the simplest tools.33 In fact, the act, like 
using a stone to kill a monkey, can even be transmitted non-verbally through 
mimesis to other humans. Lately, the discovery of so-called mirror neurons in 
monkeys’ brains might explain how this process operates. Mirror neurons are 
pathways in the brain that fire in similar patterns regardless if an action is seen 
or carried out34. Thus, the translation of the object and language also 
simultaneously takes place in the body’s neuro-system. Body and object melt 
together to become one unit. 
 
We do not have to get into the latest neuroscience to understand this 
phenomenon. Envision yourself picking up a tool you are familiar with, a 
hammer. You are well-tuned to this instrument. You have used it before many 
times; you like it; it has served you well; however, this tool is broken. Maybe 
the shaft is cracked or the head is loose, and so thereby the act of using it is 
changed. The act to drive a nail into wood is no longer an easy act of pleasure. 
How does this affect you? What are your feelings? Is it not a sensation of pain 
you experience? Is it not as if the lifeless tool somehow has become integrated 
with your body, as if your nervous system somehow projects out through the 
wood in the shaft? This thought experiment can be applied to a number of 
situations: the car that doesn’t start, the computer that freezes and crashes, etc. 
The translation inherent in the making has become a transformation of the 
body: the tool has shaped us. This act should be seen as an accumulation of 
knowledge. 
                                                 
32 Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, 22. 
33 Doidge, The Brain That Changes Itself, 26. 
34 Oberman, Pineda, and Ramachandran, “The human mirror neuron system,” 62. 
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Now let us return to important questions from the viewpoint of the object: 
Why and how is this translation possible? So, back to the stone at the riverbed: 
the stone in the beginning had in itself no intention. Its shape was coincidental. 
The stone was not created to become any of the tools it turned out to be. It 
was, however, made, and this making brought out its potential, attributes, 
physical entities, and its abilities to become something. In philosophy, 
Immanuel Kant speaks of the differences between the object35-in-itself (Ding 
an sich) and the objects we can perceive through our senses. Heidegger 
describes acts resulting in "bringing-forth" the concealment of the object’s 
essence. Both these philosophers outline the idea of a translative making. 
However, for me, it is perhaps the eighteenth century Italian philosopher and 
historian Giambattista Vico who has the sharpest expression of the act of 
translation in his device, Verum esse ipsum factum—the truth itself is made. “Men 
know the truth of only those things they have made (Verum esse ipsum 
factum).”36 
 
In part we can understand the translation as a mechanism that turns on and off 
hidden attributes of the stone; the making translates the object by bringing 
forth certain performances of these hidden attributes. Design as a discipline 
operates by bringing forward these hidden attributes. 
 
                                                 
35 This usually is translated as “the thing-in-itself”; however, in accordance with my nomenclature I have chose 
the synonym object. 
36 Kunze, Thought and Place, 78. 
Extended quote: “… the composite truth that Vico sketched out in an early work, "that men know the truth of only 
those things they have made (Verum esse ipsum factum) But this possible knowledge mirrored the composite 
nature of human life itself. And through this devise of the verum/factum, Vico turned to the question of human 
origins to ask, of the world poetically made by the mythic mind, what truth might be found in the thunder of Jove, 
the Labors of Hercules or the Rite of Cybele” 
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We can see the on-and-off mechanism quite clearly in the simple game Rock-
Paper-Scissors (figure 17-22).  The closed-fist-hard-stone wins by breaking the 
two-fingers-brittle-scissors. The open-hand-paper wins by wrapping the fist-
stone, and the sharp-finger-scissors cut through the open-hand-brittle-paper. 
Rock-Paper-Scissors rulework operates by a double take of the objects 
involved. First, the signs formed by the hand relate to two functions of the 
object, paper’s brittle quality and its ability to wrap; the context defines which 
of the two gets activated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. 
Rock beats scissors.  
 
Figure 18. 
Paper beats rock. 
 
Figure 19. 
Scissors beats paper. 
 
Figure 20. 
Rock beats scissors.  
 
Figure 21. 
Paper beats rock. 
 
Figure 22. 
Scissors beats paper. 
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MICKEY: “All right, rock beats paper.” (Mickey smacks Kramer on the hand for 
losing)  
KRAMER: “I thought paper covered rock?” 
MICKEY: “Nah, rock flies right through paper.” 
KRAMER: “What beats rock?” 
MICKEY: (looks at his hand) “Nothing beats rock.” 
KRAMER: “All right, come on.” 
KRAMER & MICKEY: Rock, paper, scissors, match. 
KRAMER: “Rock.” 
MICKEY: “Rock.” 
KRAMER & MICKEY: Rock, paper, scissors, match. 
KRAMER: Rock. 
MICKEY: Rock.37 
 
Mickey’s translation changed the active parts in the game, and a whole new 
relationship emerged. This new translation makes the match rather pointless. 
Similarly, in the following scene from the television series Seinfeld the rulework 
is distorted by the translation of the object’s qualities.  
 
 
                                                 
37 Cherones, Seinfeld, and David, "The Stand-In.” season 5, episode 16, TV series Seinfeld. 
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Again, back to the activated stone at the river bed. We can see this as a 
making of a making. Albeit the first making was accidental, it shows how 
objects can be understood as senders of knowledge—know-how. There are 
attributes that have been activated in the stone as well as in the body. 
Simultaneously, we find a language emerges.  In this case, once the cultural act 
is established (the hammering, the cutting, or the killing), the first making can 
be strengthened by a transformation of the object or a refinement of the 
techniques of usage, and the sign production can be reinforced to better 
illustrate the act. The hammer, the ax, the weapon can be tuned to perform in a 
Figure 23. 
Rock beats paper. 
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better way. This process, though it happened in small steps and did not have a 
named designer, is a design process.  
 
So what are the discoveries here? We can understand makings, and 
consequently the design process, as operations that bring forward—activate—
sometimes hidden attributes, attributes of the involved: object(s), language(s) 
or/and body(s). Furthermore, this activation can be seen as an act of 
interlinkage; i.e. manipulation of one aspect would probably alter the other 
attributes. This alteration can be understood as translations (semiotic) or 
transformations (corporeal). We can understand these acts of translation and 
transformation in the act of makings of makings as transmission, a process 
where something gets packed—sent/received—unpacked. To understand this 
process, we have to establish what can be packed/unpacked, made, and 
how it can be sent/received, transmitted. Furthermore, we have to be able to 
discuss these makings as non-hierarchical dynamic constitutions. With this I 
am ready to construct a theoretic diagram that illustrates the model and 
establishes a terminology for this research.  
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 Objecticity, Textuality, and  Sensomobility 
 
Picasso once compared people’s inability to understand cubism with his own 
inability to read an English book—which he portrayed as: “blank to me.” 38 He 
thereby pointed out the dual activation involved in makings of makings; i.e., 
both writing (packing) and reading (unpacking) must be seen as acts of 
activations. Picasso’s book is still a text where a sender has packed and sent 
something; however, if the recipient does not possess the necessary tools to 
receive and/or unpack, the book becomes blank, inactive, and so does the stone at 
the riverbed and the glass at Platå and the body seated in a chair. Makings 
activate regardless of whether we are viewing the body, the object, or the 
language involved. Furthermore, although we can think of these entities in 
themselves, they become interesting only when they are active in systems. to 
understand this concept we must establish a terminology for the language, the 
object and the body: activated. Since we have Picasso’s book fresh in mind, let us 
use it to help us start to define: the language-activated. 
 
Picasso’s blank book can in a Kantian sense be understood as a text-in-itself. 
However, once the book is translated to an understood language or the reader 
learns its language, a textness, textabicity or textability is produced; i.e., the reading 
evokes a reaction. This language-activated I have chosen to call textuality, a term 
borrowed from semiotics. Textuality is a broad term that has many 
connotations. Here, however, it is perceived as part of the sign, the text and 
the language that are operable in a making. Textuality is not to be understood 
as the intention is communicated in an unchangeable for from sender to 
recipient. Textualty can be present in the process regardless of whether the act 
                                                 
38 Extended quote as transcribed in, Harrison and Wood, Art in Theory 1900 - 2000, 216. 
 Cubism is no different from any other school of painting. The same principles and the same elements are 
common to all. The fact that for a long time cubism has not been understood and that even today there are 
people who cannot see anything in it, means nothing. I do not read English, and an English book is a blank to 
me. This does not mean that the English language does not exist, and why should I blame anyone but myself if I 
cannot understand what I know nothing about? 
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is evoked by it or is a good or a bad reflection of the sender’s intentions. When 
the rock of the riverbed became a representation for hammers, axes or 
weapons, it operated with textuality, regardless of whether or not it had an 
intention to connote these images. The textuality concepts are not implying 
that the sender and the receiver are two different entities. Textuality has been 
transferred in the act of translation, the stone to an ax; in Eco’s words again, if 
“he calls it ‘a stone that serves for something’ (irrespective of whether he calls it so to others, or 
out loud).”X  Furthermore, it is silly to think that the force of textuality can be 
applied independently of what is evoked by the objects and bodies involved. 
Like Dali’s crutches, textuality needs its posterior to stand.  
 
As discussed above, the object has abilities that can be turned on and off. This 
capacity is due to the act they are involved in. Instead of a semiotic game, 
where different hand signs represent the objects, we could think of a rock, 
paper, scissors match where we bring in the real objects, a rock, a paper and 
scissors. Here it is easy to observe how the paper’s ability to wrap or the 
paper’s ability to be cut is activated into the act of wrapping and cutting. This 
illustrates the translations of objects, tools, artifacts, stuff in the physical realm. 
Oddly enough, I have not found any suitable existing term for this objectness, or 
objectability, in my research. That is not to say that the concept is unknown, just 
that the isolated element of the object’s turned-on ability remains without an 
appropriate word. I have therefore coined the word objecticity. Objecticity is, of 
course, a construct of the word object and the two suffixes –ic and –ity. The 
suffix -ic is used for “denoting a particular form or instance of a noun in for 
example (aesthetic; tactic).”39 The suffix –ity is used to “form nouns denoting 
quality or condition (authority; humility; purity), an instance or degree of this (a 
monstrosity; capacity).” 40 Consequently, the form object-ic-ity serves us well, as 
the object’s particular instance’s quality or the quality of the particular instance 
of an object. 
 
                                                 
39 “Mondofacto Dictionary.” 
40 Ibid. 
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Objecticity is the active part of an object, a tool, an artifact in a making similar 
to how textuality is seen as the active part of a text; it is the aspect which 
enables objects to operate in the making as well as making to operate around 
objects. Objects and their objecticity are often taken for granted. Through 
makings, we can store objecticitive memories, memories such as configurations 
of the body in space (the chair) and hammering (the stone). Objecticity can 
therefore, as textuality, be understood as knowledge of individuals or societies 
and, as such, it can be transmitted and accumulated over time and space. (We 
going to return to the terminology of knowledge in Part III.) Objects have 
corporeal aspects, such as physicality, shape, materiality and tectonics. 
Objecticity is the ability of these physical aspects to constitute behaviors and 
actions, to link social activities. This is done through the makings of makings. 
Objecticity and textuality can, accordingly, be seen as a form of an exoskeleton 
of memory and knowledge that supports and attaches itself to the body’s 
memory and knowledge systems.  
 
In textuality and objecticity we have found two terms that describe the 
involvement of language and the object in acts of making. To complete the 
diagram we need a term that describes the involvement of the biomechanics as 
well as the sense of the body. It is easy to understand the body as the start and 
the end point of every making; however, the schema is more complex. It is 
more fruitful to understand the forces of makings as an open-ended, inter-
reliant diagram. The body is an intricate sensory-motor system that slowly, 
through evolution, has been shaped. We can see this evaluative transformation 
as a slow accumulation of knowledge or maybe more accurately, as an 
accumulation of knowledge that essentially operates similarly to the 
accumulative genetic process. Imagine a stop-motion movie—one of those 
films where you see a flower grow from a seed to a full-grown plant, bloom 
and vanish, in just a minute—showing the slow evolution of life in high-speed, 
from mono-cellular to complex multi-cellular organisms. The trial and error 
process here reminds us of a child who understands—learns about—the 
world. The major difference between the knowledge of textuality and objecticity and 
this knowledge is the time of accumulation. 
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Usually we recognize genetic accumulative abilities as instincts, and, as such, 
we place them opposite cultural knowledge in the old nurture/nature 
dichotomy. However, the distinction of natural instincts and cultural knowledge 
is somewhat troublesome. As we have seen, the schema does not let itself 
explain as a clear-cut gestalt against a well-defined background. Instead, we 
constantly find that the background and gestalt exist as a fuzzy symbiotic 
overlay. The linkage between body, object and language utilizes the body’s 
ability to know-how and know-of. We have an instinct to gain knowledge, or 
instinct is knowledge. Chomsky talks about the ability to learn languages as 
deep structure. We are not born with Swedish, English, Swahili or Latin; 
nevertheless, we are born with the ability to learn Swedish, English, Swahili or 
Latin. The psycholinguist Steven Pinker describes this ability (to learn, develop 
and use language) as an instinct.41  The same rationale can be applied (as we 
did above) to the act of sitting. We are not born with a language or a perfect 
boundary towards the chair: we acquire it. The body activates by its context.  
 
I had some problem naming this activated ability of the body—this bodyness, 
this bodibility, this corpocity; however, after discussion with colleagues, the 
decision fell on the medical term: sensomobility. The term implies the body’s 
active mental and corporeal involvement in the act of making; the 
involvement of muscles, bones, blood vessels, ligaments, nerves, and synapses 
as well as more hard-to-define faculties, such as memory and imagination. Like 
objecticity and textuality, sensomobility is understood as a knowledge that is 
accumulated over time and space, a knowledge transmitted through our very 
DNA. Sensomobility can be understood as the genetic part of our knowledge 
triad: Textuality, Objeticity and  Sensomobility.  
 
                                                 
41 Pinker, The Language Instinct. 
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In these three terms we find, albeit in different forms, the same mechanics in 
effect. Together they form an intricate system of rules that guide all processes 
of makings. Now we can see the three different entities as opening channels 
where transmissions take place. In order to effectively employ the principles of 
makings of makings we might think of the entities as both packings (sendings) 
and unpacking (receivings). For example, when one sits in the chair, it sends 
through objecticity, whereas the body receives through sensomobility. This 
principle operates in the opposite direction, too. When we drive a car we are 
sending and acting mainly through sensomobility (the foot presses the gas 
Figure 24. 
The objecticity, textuality, 
and sensomobility 
diagram. 
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pedal); then the car receives and acts through objecticity (the car accelerates). If 
we continue the car illustration, the communication back from the car to the 
driver through meters and indicators is largely a textaulitive sending to a 
sensomobilitiv receiving. If you then get into the mechanical part of the car 
(under-the-hood-transmissions in the form of different devices, such as 
pulleys, levers, sensors, and cogs), you will find a whole system that is—except 
for car mechanics—purely objecticitive in its characteristics. One of my 
students from Nebraska, Alexander Jack, did a project based on the car 
interface where he studied the whole communication system between machine 
and man.42 As the example of the hotel key shows, in addition, we have to 
think of this transmission taking place in a multi-channeled structure. The key 
return is communicated through the textuality of the signage “please return the 
key” as well as through objecticity—the heavy weight. Think of controlling the 
speed of traffic both as the 30 km/h speed limit-sign (textuality to 
sensomobility) and the speed bump (objecticity to objecticity).  
 
We have now created a theoretic diagram (figure 24) that I have found very 
useful when I navigate makings of makings. The benefits of the diagram are 
that it has given me an understanding of the involved entities adaptability to 
each other, their interchangeability and interrelationships. It is consequently 
important to understand that the area, the force field, created in between 
textuality, objecticity, and sensomobility, does not always follow the same 
outline—makings differ. Therefore, the shape and the size of the gray area is 
going to differ. Some makings might lean towards differences in the three 
entities; i.e., some makings are heavily dependent on the body, while others 
might rest more on a linguistic structure, and yet others might operate mostly 
by the objects involved. I have found that one of the powers of the designer is 
to understand and manipulate the force field by strengthening or weakening the 
pull of the three entities, textuality, objecticity, and/or sensomobility. 
Furthermore, the diagram successfully frees our thought process from the 
artificial supremacy of language. 
                                                 
42 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Anthropolog[y]ists.” 
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I believe that we now have an operable terminology. This theoretic diagram 
and this terminology have become vital for how I define and understand the 
world of stuff and stuff— how I operate in my praxis—regardless if I am in the 
role of the maker of objects, the educator, or the researcher.  Before I 
conclude this first part permit me to briefly introduce two concepts that I 
believe reflect a similar way of thinking: Bruno Latours, actants (non-
human/human), and Richard Dawkings, meme. 
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The World of Stuff and Stuff is a World of Statements 
 
Buno Latour, the anthropologist with the hotel key, argues for a view where 
actions in a network (system, society), such as returning the keys in the hotel, 
follow statements made by actors. These statements operate similarly, 
regardless if they are made by humans or non-humans. These statements also 
can be sent as signage or as objects. 
 
By statement we mean anything that is thrown, sent, or delegated by an 
enunciator. The meaning of the statement can thus vary along the way. 
Sometimes it refers to a word, sometimes to an object, sometimes to an 
apparatus and sometimes to an institution… The word ‘statementʼ 
therefore refers not to linguistics, but to the gradient that carries us 
from words to things and from things to words. (Latour, Sociology of 
Monsters, 106.) 
 
If we accept the findings of the diagram [see name figure] as a system of 
knowledge, we talk about three levels of knowledge: textualitive, objecticitive 
and sensomobilitive. I am far from alone to have seen these comparable 
mechanics as knowledge. The similarity between genetic knowledge and 
learned knowledge led the biologist Richard Dawkins to formulate a cultural 
theory based on the rulework of evolution. Dawkins advocates a gene-centered 
view where the surviving of the replicators (the genes), rather than the bodies 
that carry them, dictates the rules. In his book, “The Selfish Gene,” he 
introduces the meme as a cultural unit essentially thought of as having the same 
mechanics as the genes.  
 
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch phrases, clothes fashions, 
ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate 
themselves in the gene pool leaping from body to body via sperms or 
egg, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from 
brain to brain via a process that in broad sense can be called imitation. 
(Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 192.) 
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Dawkins describes his meme as an outside-the-body sequence of information. 
It could be a word, a tool or a concept. The meme is essentially thought of as 
following the same principle as the gene: the ability to copy itself in perpetuity. 
Similar to Dawkins’ “definition of the gene,” the meme is thought of as having 
an almost independent life. That is to say: a meme survives in the society if it 
has what it takes to survive and if the society would defend its memes, 
sometimes at all costs. 
 
“The old gene-selected evolution, by making brains, provided the soup 
in which the first meme arose. Once self-copying memes had arisen, 
their own, much faster evolution took off… Imitation in the broad 
sense is how memes can replicate. But just as not all genes that can 
replicate do so successfully, so some memes are more successful in the 
meme-pool than others… in general they must be the same discussed 
for replicators…: longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity.  (Ibid., 194.) 
 
We are going to return to these two theoretical viewpoints—Latour’s similarity 
of statements made by humans and non-humans; and Dawkins’ meme—in the 
third part of this publication.  
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Observations and Continuation 
 
Part I was an attempt to define the kinds of transmissions of statement that are 
involved in design praxes. We have constructed a sustainable model that takes 
into consideration some prime foundations in my research: 
 
 an anthropocentric point of view;  
 an interaction of body, object, and language; 
 an acknowledgement of change; and 
 a value-neutral system. 
 
The elasticity of the system, based on human life, gives us a good tool to 
understand the dynamics of social change and flux. The system balances the 
influence of the bodies, the objects and the languages involved in the process 
of making. Albeit the system borrows energy, terminology, and ways of 
thinking from other disciplines other praxes I believe it is still very much a 
design theory, and it articulates a basic and fundamental system of rules used 
by most practicing designers as a type of professional common sense within 
the discipline.  
 
We have seen how we can understand the of’s in the sentence makings of 
makings as transmission of statements. These statements can be understood 
as packed-sent/received-unpacked in different channels, channels that we have 
defined as objecticity, textuality, and sensomobility. We have discovered that 
these transmissions can make connections, linkages, sometimes so strong that 
objects, language, and bodies must seem fused into a symbiotic system. 
Furthermore we have discussed makings as both transformations and 
translations. Therefore, in the attempt to alter the world of stuff and stuff I as a 
designer, navigate a complex web of objecticitive, textualitive, and 
sensomobilitive translations and transformations—we are makers by object, by 
body, and by language.  
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In the next Part, the Player Piano, we are going to examine, not only what the 
transmission and connections consist of but also: how they start to bind larger 
structures together; how statements can be thought of as constructing 
narratives; and what is the driving force of social transformations and 
translations. So far, we have found our answers by looking under (at) rocks, 
returning keys, and sitting in chairs. These are rather small, individual and time-
limited acts. We now need to construct a more complex narrative to see if the 
theoretical model holds water, a process in which we can see the actions at 
work over a longer time.  
55 
 
  

57 
 
The Ghost in the Machine 
 
A memory: In an international hotel lobby somewhere (one of thousands like it). A 
constant flow of people—tourists, businessmen, families, delivery boys—are passing by; 
everybody is in a hurry, eager to get in or out of their rooms, out of the lobby, out into the city. 
No one is paying attention to the background music. The choice of songs, a selection of soft 
arrangements of mainstream tunes like Candle in the Wind, Yesterday, I Just Called 
To Say I Love You, clearly indicates that the music is not intended to be noticed. 
Nevertheless, I’m drawn in, not so much by the selections of songs, but by the source of the 
music. A player piano is placed in the corner of the space—a self-playing mechanism operated 
by a punch card. At the turn of the last century it was state-of-the-art; today it is a dated 
technology for music reproduction. As I observe the mechanism operating the keyboard, 
something happens—a ghost appears. The player of the piano is there. A pair of invisible 
hands becomes detectable in the moving keys, as a shadow, as an index, the ghost in the 
machinery, the Ghost of the Player Piano. 
 
 
Figure 25. 
The mechanisms of a 
player piano as showed 
by Reg Richings at the 
ReStore, Ealing London. 
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To explain how and why the specter of the player piano appears requires an 
understanding of a complex apparatus. The act is linked together by a 
multitude of mental and physical structures; it traces its origins from a series of 
innovations and designs, and innovators and designers; and it necessitates an 
intricate network of social fabrication—makings of makings. The 
investigation into how the invisible hands, the Ghost of the Player Piano, came in 
to being and survived over the years gives us an excellent opportunity to 
explore two things: the fundamental principle of interrelations of objects in the 
act of making and the speculative methodology, the design narrative that 
governs a big part of this research. The attempt is to clarify: 
 
 How do statements of making interrelate, constructing narratives? 
 How can we understand and discuss these interrelationships? 
 
Here we are going to explore the act of makings of makings through an 
investigation of how transformations and translations occur over time. In this 
generative process, not so different from Natural Selection, we will find how 
the three levels of knowledge—textuality, objecticity, and sensomobility—
introduced in the previous chapter, will interact and change poles as the 
evolution progresses. This involves investigating the operation of the two 
terms, technology and technique. These terms are here defined as they are used in 
common language, for example:  
 
 The latest technology of the combustion engine permits less carbon 
monoxide to escape. 
 The industrial revolution came about due to a series of technological 
innovations. 
 The footballer, Zidane, had a superior technique permitting him to move 
fast with the ball. 
 Her knitting technique was excellent. 
 
59 
 
The former, technology, relates to all our manufactured things; the latter, 
techniques, relates to how these are put in use; a concert pianist would have 
certain technique to use the technology that is the piano. Questions about the 
interrelations between technology and technique have guided the formation of 
all my laboratories; however, the interest is particularly strong in the Piecemeal 
Meal43 (figure 26) and the Sports Jacket.44 (figure 27) 
 
 
 
It is important to point out that the term technology here is not referring only 
to the latest technology (in use), but rather to all of our tools, artifacts, and objects; 
and sometimes also to living things and nature, for example in the 
domestication of animals. Technology is stuff and stuff (used and in use). Today 
we are so overwhelmed with stuff and stuff that we sometimes forget that a 
simple thing like an ordinary hammer is generated from (and still generates) a 
rather complex network of actants.  
                                                 
43 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Piecemeal Meal.” 
44 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Sports Jacket.” 
Figure 26. 
the Piecemeal Meal.  
 
Figure 27. 
the Sports Jacket.  
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Furthermore, different generations of technologies overlap with fuzzy borders; 
stages, states and layers of technology often coexist superimposed and 
entangled; or as the writer Douglas Adams puts it:  
 
1. “Anything that is in the world when you're born is normal and ordinary 
and is just a natural part of the way the world works.  
2. Anything that's invented between when you're fifteen and thirty-five is 
new and exciting and revolutionary and you can probably get a career 
in it.  
3. Anything invented after you're thirty-five is against the natural order of 
things.”45  
 
This overlay of technologies is, as we will see, evident when we outline the 
evolution of the ghost of the player piano.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Adams, The Salmon of Doubt, 95. 
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How would this outline be executed? What is the methodology of this exploration? We have 
to remember that this is a research through design and that it is written by a 
designer. So, while the hunt of the Ghost of the Player Piano is taking place in a 
historic setting, the methodology is not that of a historic survey. Design, the 
makings of makings, weaves together stories constructed by an array of 
statements. As we discussed in the previous chapter these statements can be 
carried in various forms (textuality, objecticity, and sensomobility). 
Accordingly, in order to track down our ghost, we must approach the making 
from a number of viewpoints. This is not to be understood as a correct 
chronological historic survey of the piano as a musical instrument, but rather a 
pursuit to understand how the figure ground relationship between man and 
media are interlinked through its transformations and translations. The strategy 
for this pursuit has, therefore, been the same—the design narrative—that I am 
using as a designer to define how, what and why transformation is constituted in 
a given act, regardless if I am making: furniture,46food trays,47 pavilions, 48houses, 
restaurants,49 garments,50 or makers.51 52 
 
 
  
  
                                                 
46 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Bre[a]king Making Chair.” 
47 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Piecemeal Meal.” 
48 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Broken Horizon.” 
49 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Platå Bar.” 
50 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Sports Jacket.” 
51 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Crafts[men].” 
52 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Anthropolog[y]ists.” 
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Design Narrative  
 
To take on any design project is to immerse oneself in an intriguing network of 
mental and physical structures, a world of overlapping and interrelating 
statement. In his attempt to forecast the future, the designer plays the role of a 
science fiction writer weaving together a story of topographical, historical, 
cultural, technological, aesthetic, and ethical phenomena, as well as time and 
myth. Since, as we discussed in the previous part, statements can be seen as 
both linguistic (textuality) and corporeal (objecticity), the stories designers write 
must be transmitted in multiple channels. To weave stories, design has to 
develop tools for the study of human life, societies and social patterns 
(techniques), as well as mechanical, physical and material structures 
(technology). This way of telling stories—forecasting the future—is what I 
have come to call a design narrative. 
 
Besides the designer’s role as a sender and writer, he also becomes a receiver 
and reader of the same science fiction insofar as he has to understand the 
network into which he merges the design. This duality of the role of the 
designer as a writer/reader has created specific tools of analyses. Although 
these analytical tools are similar to, say, a historian or an anthropologist, they 
are specifically developed for design. A designer is a traveler invited into a 
different culture. This is true regardless if the Other (or the exotic) is a remote 
tribe, our own society or an individual—design serves all of these categories. 
As an invitee with a given task to intermingle, he finds himself in a unique 
role—not the stranger or the tourist—but the foreigner. Design operates 
within an exotic attitude towards the daily, the mundane, the average, the here and 
the commonplace, as well as the extraordinary, the remote, the there and the peripheral.   
 
The design narrative is a way for the designer to immerse himself into the 
design process both as a Maker and a User. The method stretches the term 
narrative beyond a sole verbal structure to encompass a cognitive multisensory 
process. The definition of the design narrative is therefore (as the design 
laboratory) a speculative research where statements of texturality, objecticity 
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and sensomobility are isolated, tested, verified, and put back into the situation, 
based on the modularity of their plausibility rather than their factuality. In this 
methodology, the predictions, forecasts, and simulations let the designer live 
the design. This way to think has found its way into all the aspects of my praxis 
whether I am teaching, doing, or researching design. The processes of the 
design laboratories Platå Bar53 and the Broken Horizon54 (figure 28) are two 
good instances where the design narrative helped me understand intrinsic 
ruleworks of makings. 
 
 
 
In my role as an educator, I have found the design narrative as a constructive 
pedagogical device in that it gives the students an anthropological 
understanding of underlying principles of, and the rulework governing, 
makings of makings. I have collected the work with students in the 
laboratory the Makings of Anthropology.55 I have in a series of makings asked 
students to immerse themselves in the intriguing network of mental and 
physical structures by insertion of Foreign Objects56—objects that do not 
originally belong—into daily acts. By this insertion the ruleworks of the act are 
                                                 
53 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Platå Bar.” 
54 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Broken Horizon.” 
55 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Anthropolog[y]ists.” 
56 Ibid. 
Figure 28. 
Prototyping as part of the 
design narrative process 
of the Broken Horizon. 
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studied, in a multisensory-storyboard.57 Sometimes the study takes the form of a 
real making where a foreign object is fabricated and tested one-to-one. (figure 
29-31) A little bit like Sam Spade’s method in The Maltese Falcon, "My way of 
learning is to heave a wild and unpredictable monkey-wrench into the 
machinery."58 The foreign object forces the design student to place themselves 
right in the material-semiotic narrative of their creation. 
 
 
 
The creative act has to be given an opening where intuition, speculation and 
odd ideas have outlets. The design narrative methodology therefore does not 
have the same strict partial rulework as a history survey; however, the 
speculations in the narrative should still hold up for scrutiny. That is that the 
story has to have valid: transferability, dependability, and confirmability. With that 
said, let us dive down into the Mystery of the Ghost of the Player Piano.  
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Hammett, The Maltese Falcon, 86. 
Figure 29. 
An one-to-one student 
making where a foreign 
object is inserted in a 
daily act, the Cuel, Daniel 
Siedhoff. 
 
Figure 30. 
An one-to-one student 
making where a foreign 
object is inserted in a 
daily act, Extreme 
Dinner, Sofie Lagberg. 
 
 
Figure 31. 
An one-to-one student 
making where a foreign 
object is inserted in a 
daily act, Auto Lingo, 
Alexandeer Jack. 
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The First Paradigm – Hunting for Music  
 
Where and when is our ghost born? 
 
There is no definite theory about whether the hunter’s bow developed into a 
stringed instrument or the other way around.59 Any hunter-gatherer societies 
that developed the technology of a string (animal ligament or a strip of 
bamboo as used in the bow in the Highland of Papua New Guinea) held in 
tension by a wood branch would have discovered its double usage—the 
hunter’s bow and the musical instrument. Both of them clearly stem from the 
same root. For the sake of this argument let us assume the technology of bow 
and arrows for hunting predates the tense string’s use to produce music. 
Already, in the alteration from hunter’s-bow to music-bow we can begin to 
detect the beautiful dance between technology and technique in that the 
technology (the hunter’s-bow) evolves into a new technique (playing a bow). 
We can also detect that the translation of the act is driven primarily by a shift 
of sensomobility. The act translates from an act driven by vision-to-movement 
to an act driven by hearing-to-movement. The shift is simultaneously altering 
the objecticity in so far as it utilizes different physical aspects of the bow, from 
a generator of direct force to a generator of vibration. Ultimately this leads to a 
shift of textuality as the same object is now represented by two signs: the music 
bow and the hunter’s-bow. This translation employs the same rulework we 
detected in the translation of the stone at the riverbed in the previous section.   
 
The reuse—misuse—ultimately leads to a durable and incorporated new 
technique. By plucking the string while at the same time changing the tension 
on a bow one can begin to play a melody. In this primitive instrument we can 
find almost all the components that still constitute contemporary string 
instruments. One just has to add such features as multiple strings, resonance 
box, grip board with threads and a few others to complete the laundry list of 
                                                 
59 Rault, Musical Instruments. Quote: “In use since prehistory the music bow is now found in all five continents, 
whether it was originally created for use in hunting is unclear” 
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technology that constitutes a number of instruments. The harp, the guitar, the 
mandolin, the sitar can all trace their birth from that (assumed) single step 
(hunter’s bow to music bow) of innovation—design.  
 
This can be said regardless of whether these objects have a clear defined birth 
place (i.e. was once invented somewhere and then spread to all other objects 
like it) or multiple origins (i.e. was invented in a number of locations without 
any connection). The act of innovation operates in the same manner in any 
case; the musical instruments were born through a change of technique rather 
than through a change of technology. That a re-usage of an existing technology 
(bow, stone) can fabricate (translate) a new technology (instrument, ax) 
illustrates an important aspect of design. As has been pointed out, design and 
innovation can be a shift in the usage of an object, rather than a shift in the 
object itself. We interpret this as reuse or misuse, depending of which 
viewpoint we have. Parkour, the non-competitive sport or activity where the 
participants run along a predefined path, negotiating obstacles and 
obstructions using only the body, is a good example of this phenomenon. 
Parkour finds its energy in that it reuses daily objects, often in the scale of the 
public realm of the city. So, for example, can a hand rail on a staircase become 
a balance bar, an objecticity shift from security to excitement. Is this a reuses 
or misuse? In the Piecemeal Meal,60 a series of food trays (technology) developed 
to serve (technique) a Lebanese cuisine, are inserted into a new environment, 
the Swedish smorgasbord. This insertion of the technology alters the technique 
of serving food of smorgasbord radically. 
 
We have here used the word innovation synonymously with design, although 
the demarcation line between these two terms is far from sharp. But can we 
really call these acts of translation (the ax to the weapon, the hunter’s-bow to 
the music bow, or the rail to the balance bar) innovations? Generally, an 
innovation is thought of as a new object, a new technology, emerging out of a 
changed need or necessity. Certainly a lot of technical progress can be 
                                                 
60 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Piecemeal Meal.” 
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understood from this point of departure; techniques generate more 
sophisticated technologies. One definition, however, does not preclude the 
other. The idea of innovations as shifts based on reuse or misuse is fruitful if 
we want to fully understand our Ghost. 
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Innovation is the Mother of Necessity 
 
Before an agreement is made common it can be perceived as being “against the 
natural order of things.” 61  After an agreement is made it is “just a natural part 
of the way the world works.” 62  Take, for example, the introduction of cell 
phones. Today we have reached such a point of strong, common agreement 
regarding this artifact that it is hard to even think of life without it. We need to 
be connected, anywhere and anytime; otherwise we do not feel like a part of 
society. And yet it was not a long time ago that cell phones did not exist; the 
very idea was considered science fiction; and we had absolutely no need for it. 
The existence of time before the agreement was made, before the technique 
had developed, is easily forgotten. Today we remember it as if we have always 
had a need for this technology and that the cell phone then simply sprung out 
of a need, a necessity, a technique.  But this is an illusion based on an ability to 
project and predate “the way the world works” as the way the world always 
worked. When the cell phone became generally agreed on it also became 
generally agreed on as a pair of “glasses” through which we understand the 
world. This understanding is tautological—true by virtue of its logical form 
alone; it includes the understanding of cell phones by the understanding of… 
cell phones. “We shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape us.” 63 
 
The same is true for how we view such deep-rooted and agreed-on 
technologies as moving images, laptops, and DVDs, technologies which have 
developed techniques which have impacted our society far beyond what could 
have been envisioned at the time of their birth. That such diverse cultural 
phenomena as Stradivarius, Mozart, Rock, and the myth of Näcken,64 (figure 
32) are generated from the simple act of the bow turned in to a musical 
                                                 
61 Adams, The Salmon of Doubt, 95. 
62 Ibid. 
63 McLuhan and Lapham, Understanding Media, xi. 
64 “Nordisk Familjebok,” 315. Näcken is a mythological creature that was said to live in the Swedish forest. This 
naked male gestalt would, with the lure of his violin, trick young ladies too close to water. 
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instrument follows a rather common trajectory for how object and culture are 
fabricated. The point here is that while we cannot live without these 
technologies, they did not really become the dominant agreement by a strong 
necessity. However, the story is always told by the winner. The story is told 
from the perspective of the technology that has achieved domination. Once a 
technique has translated an object it also tends to retrospectively alter its 
narrative. It is if they have intentions—the stone at the riverbed became a 
weapon because it wanted to be a weapon. 
 
 
Figure 32. 
Näcken, Ernst 
Josephsons, oil 
painting, 1882-84. 
 
Figure 33 
A classical harp, 
Museo della Civiltà 
Romana, Rome. 
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The Second Paradigm – The Ghost takes Control 
 
One of my childhood friends stopped playing the piano. He lost interest when his rather old-
fashioned piano teacher poked him hard on the palm of his hand with a ball point pen 
whenever his hand posture became too sloppy. She was not evil; her body was simply possessed 
by our ghost. 
 
The next paradigm of the bow-instrument is the branching of one object into a 
bow and an instrument. From here on we can see how different musical 
instruments get unique characteristics, the harp (figure 33) becoming a harp, 
the guitar becoming a guitar, etc. The development to multi-stringed bow 
rendered the object almost useless as a hunting tool and, consequently, we find 
a totally new approach to how its form is generated. If we understood the first 
alteration (bow to instrument) as a re-using, the next paradigm operates by 
different mechanics—re-finement (an objecticity of instrument to more 
instrument). Here the technique (plucking the bow) operates as the generator 
for the ongoing transformation. This alteration can be seen as a 
transformation. This transformation is in this paradigm driven by the 
objecticity. Alteration of materiality, shape, and construction are now 
parameters that guide the shift of the instrument. The object’s inner logic (such 
as the number of strings, the length of the individual strings, and how the 
strings are attached) as well as its boundaries and its interface (how one holds 
it, carries it and plays it) have to be understood only from the viewpoint of a 
musical instrument. These parameters direct the form-giving process which 
little by little alters the object’s size, balance and shape. The shifts in 
sensomobility followed by the shifts of objecticity and, once more, shifts in 
textuality would trail shortly behind. 
 
This paradigm might not constitute a total shift in living pattern; however, we 
probably are going to see a more complex and specialized network of 
technologies emerge here. There are some major reasons why multi-string-
instruments are likely to materialize in a specialized structure of makings. 
Fabrication of the instrument will require specialized skill and tool sets. 
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Simultaneously, the more complex technology brings with it a more complex 
didactic structure. To make, for example, a guitar- or a harp-like instrument it 
takes a number of tools such as planar, saw, drill, chisels, files, hammer, square, 
compass, as well as glue and varnish. The guitar and harp mobilize a bigger 
socio-corporeal network than the hunters bow. The specialization of tools, but 
also the knowhow to use them, might be hard to maintain in a hunter-gatherer 
society, if not for some other reason that objects are heavy to carry. Stuff and 
stuff weighs society down as the protagonist Tyler Durden in Chuck Palahniuk’s 
Fight Club notes: “the things you used to own, now they own you.” 65  
 
Therefore, it is easy to imagine some changes of portability, social structure, 
and density to take place simultaneously with the evolution of string 
instruments. A society always on the move that is forced to hand carry all of its 
artifacts has to prioritize differently. This is not to say that nomadic hunter-
gatherers do not develop objects with the sole purpose of producing music. 
Some of the oldest musical instruments found are manufactured in hunter-
gatherer societies. But these objects are generally small and made for easy 
transportation. A harp, even a small harp, is heavy to carry. A hunter’s bow 
that during night time turns into a music instrument is therefore easier to 
imagine to have been the choice of our hunter-gatherers. 
 
Furthermore, in a society that fully evolved the durable technology harp-like 
instruments we might have already seen changes in the social strata. In general, 
hunter-gatherers do not have a clearly defined hierarchical stratum and their 
social structures often lack absolute specialization. Craftsmen, hunters, 
warriors, priests, and musicians do not exist as individual professions. 
Although specialization occurs, it must rather be understood as a part of the 
individual’s occupation—the hunter is also a craftsman. This is not to say that 
a complex string instrument could not appear from time to time in the hunter-
gatherer society, but without specified professions to carry the development it 
is likely to be forgotten—without hosts the ghost will die. Specialization into 
                                                 
65 Palahniuk, Fight Club, 44. 
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designated jobs or trades constitutes a more advanced technology through 
educational systems. The technology of the multi-stringed instrument has to be 
maintained in an intricate didactic (school) organization, a making of makers 
of makings where the technique and the technology are passed on from 
person to person and from generation to generation.  
 
My friend’s piano teacher, mentioned above, was simply part of such a didactic system. Her 
piano teacher had used the pen technique to refine her piano technique.  
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The Third Paradigm – The Ghost Goes Hybrid 
 
"Oh, everything's stolen nowadays. Why the fax machine is nothing but a waffle iron with a 
phone attached."66 
Abe “Grandpa” Simpson, The Simpsons 
 
We have found that one technology can have more than one technique 
attached to it. But can we find that more than one technology can be 
interlinked by one technique? This is the major question as we move into a 
third paradigm. Here we find that people actually knew how to play the piano a 
long time before the piano was invented. 
 
Simplified, we can say that the multi-string paradigm was part of a shift that 
made society more dependent upon—more weighted down by—its 
technology. The same is true, literally, for the next paradigm. At one point in 
history (probably on several occasions), we can find musical instruments that 
become so big, heavy and cumbersome that we have to think of them in 
architectural scales, anchored to rooms or buildings. Pianos and organs but 
also church bells and big gongs are, by their sheer size and weight, not mobile, 
at least not easily mobile. As in the case of the second paradigm, we have to 
picture this as a part of a different society. Big and immovable instruments 
have to be stored and permanently maintained. Stationary instruments mobilize 
even a bigger socio-corporeal network than the multi-stringed ones. The 
stationary instruments live in a society of settlers, instruments for city dwellers. 
When this happens we really can see the player piano’s forerunners in 
instruments like huge harps and pipe organs. If we want to stretch the 
definition of music instrument we might see Classical Greek theaters as an 
expression of this paradigm’s makings. With its acoustic construction, the 
Greek theater operates as a huge resonance box, amplifying the actors’ voices 
in song and speech. To fully understand music and musical instruments, we 
                                                 
66 Silverman, Groening, and Brooks, Krusty Gets Kancelled. season 4, episode 22 TV series the Simpsons 
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always have to include the spatial condition in which it is performed/they are 
played.  
 
The first known (stringed) piano-like instrument, called the clavichord (figure 
35), developed somewhere in Europe during the Middle Ages, where and when 
is debated.67 However, this is a design narrative and with the logic of Grandpa 
Simpson we can understand this transformation as: the music bow or the harp 
that got enclosed into a box. To fully understand how this transformation 
came about, we have to back up a little. The harp-in-a-box must be seen as the 
culmination of a development that started much earlier and, surprisingly, 
centered not on stringed instruments, but pipe instruments—the development 
of the pipe organ (figure 34) (Greece in the third century BC68). Which leads us 
back to the statement: there were people that knew how to play the piano a long time 
before the piano was invented. Although a piano is referred to as a string instrument 
the technique of playing the piano—hitting the key on a keyboard—and a 
harp—plucking of strings—is not remotely the same. The significance of the 
pipe organ, for our story, is therefore mainly the keyboard and the mechanics 
behind it. To craft a piano, the keyboard is a crucial feature. It was in the 
uninhabited keyboard we first detected our ghost. Furthermore, the 
introduction of the keyboard to the domain of string instruments signifies a 
complex hybridization. A thinking that allies not only different technologies 
(pipe organ and harp), but also brings techniques attached to one domain to 
the other. Here we encounter use becoming re-use, but through an altogether 
different technology.  
 
                                                 
67 Brauchli, The Clavichord, 8. “Sebastian Virdung, a German priest, theorist and composer as well as the 
author of the first printed manual on musical instruments, Musica getutscht (Basle, 1511), admitted that he knew 
neither who was the clavichord’s inventor nor who gave it its name.” 
68 Randel, The New Harvard Dictionary of Music, 583. 
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It makes sense that the idea of the keys and the keyboard springs out of the 
pipe organ’s wind-based technology. The act of allowing or hindering the air 
stream by opening and closing valves in an organ is logically accomplished 
through a system of pivoting keys. As the pipes in the organ multiply, the keys 
multiply and we can see the birth of the first keyboard. Now one person could 
control a whole series of pipes through a simple touch of the fingers. In 
contrast, a keyboard device for plucking strings is a substantial step with so 
little to gain.   
 
With this first keyboard we can picture a whole new technique arising. Playing 
on a keyboard instrument has nothing or very little to do with playing the flute 
or a harp. As this technique is refined through schools and conventions, we 
will find that it gains strength and cultural significance. Finally, it becomes so 
strong that it has made the next phase possible. Therefore, the knowledge of 
how to play the piano was, partly, already in use before the first piano was even 
invented. It is not hard to picture the inventor(s) of the first piano-like 
instrument as a former pipe organist. When knowledge of how to play a 
keyboard was transferred to the world of harps, a new actant was born—the 
pianist. As he allied himself with the intricate network of bows, harps, pipe 
organs, he made tremendous gains, but these gains came with costs of 
Figure 34. 
Organ from third century 
AD, Museo della Civiltà 
Romana, Rome. 
 
Figure 35. 
A clavichord. 
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dependency and specialization. Keeping in mind that the story, the Ghost of the 
Player Piano does not end here, let us digress for a while.  
 
Despite the fact that this analysis of the piano’s development is merely a brief 
sketch ignoring numerous historical, social, and economic factors affecting the 
process, it provides a good foundation from which to build. So far we have 
found a number of possible ways for how objects and societies are fabricated 
and linked—how some of the mechanics behind makings of makings 
operate. Let me (with a focus on objects in society) continue by sketching a 
possible model for how some of these makings and linkages are made 
possible.  
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Interobjecticity 
 
Our ghost has proved to be most clever; he survives, transfers, and transforms his gestalt from 
one paradigm to the next. He is constantly shape-shifting, going from mental to corporeal 
constructs. Sometimes he masks as a technique; sometime he hides in the technology.  
 
Before I develop this model let us formulate some questions. How do existing 
objects impact fabrication of new objects? What is the relationship between 
old and new technology? And finally, how does this maintain the whole 
fabrication of society?  
 
The semiotician Julia Kristeva developed the term to describe how one text 
can be thought linked to other texts. “[T]he text is ... a permutation of texts, an 
intertextuality: in the space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other 
texts, intersect and neutralize one another.” 69 Although the original concept 
was later borrowed and somewhat misused in absurdum, I am still weak for 
her attempt. Kristeva sees text communicate in two ways. First, we can 
understand it as sending from an author (speaker) to receiving by a reader 
(listener). Second, texts communicate with other texts in the network. 
Simplified, makings of a text can be understood as a double axis relationship 
in which a vertical axis connects the writer and reader of a text, and a 
horizontal axis connects the text to other texts. By the concept of 
intertextuality, Kristeva asks two important questions: who is speaking when I am 
speaking, and who is listening when I am listening? In this diagram (see named figure) 
a written, spoken, signed work—a text—never stands alone. It is always 
fabricated in correlation to a previous canon of work, and it will stand as a 
source for the texts subsequently produced in the same society.  
 
                                                 
69 Kristeva, Desire in Language, 36. 
Extended quotation: “[T]he text is ... a productivity, and this means: first, that its relationship to the language in 
which it is situated is redistributive (destructive-constructive) ... and [S]econd, that it is a permutation of texts, an 
intertextuality: in the space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize 
one another”  
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Kristeva’s construct seems to operate even better if it refers to how any 
making relates to other makings instead of just refers to a how text relates to 
other texts. This goes back to the interest in the of’s in makings of makings. 
In the double axis diagram, sender/recipient and objects/objects, the designer 
and users are connected in a vertical axis (figure 36) and an object relates to 
other objects in the horizontal axis (figure 39). Since we already introduced the 
term objecticity as the object’s ability to operate in society, the term 
interobjecticity for the relationship of objects in the vertical axis seems to be 
suitable. This construct is not to be understood as defining the fabrication of 
corporeal objects as always following the same rules as fabrication of texts. 
However, makings of text and makings of objects are still makings and 
therefore they are related. The act of weaving the shape of six classic chairs and 
recliners into the canopy or the Broken Horizon (figure 37 and 38) can be 
understood as an interobjecticitive act.70 
                                                 
70 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Broken Horizon.” 
Figure 36. 
Diagram of the message 
axis, designer to user. 
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If we use the terminology of Marshall McLuhan—message and media—we can 
understand the vertical axis as the sending of a message and the horizontal as 
the media, a media in which this sending takes place. Since we must 
acknowledge the two axes as a symbiotic system that relates to and produces 
each other we find a key to understanding McLuhan’s statement “media is the 
message” The vertical axis’ transmission of “messages” is done through the 
techniques and technologies that constitute the horizontal axis media. Thus the 
transmission from the sender/designer/writer is filtered and shaped 
(translated) by the forces of the vertical media axis before it finds its 
receiver/users/readers.  
Figure 37. 
Brian Tieman is testing 
interobjecticitive 
transmission in the 
canopy of the pavilion of 
the Broken Horizon, in 
the form of the outline of 
Le Corbusier’s Chaise 
Lounge. 
 
Figure 38. 
Le Corbusier’s Chaise 
Lounge. 
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We have already in the case of the piano detected a number of ways of viewing 
how the horizontal axis operates—how makings relate to other makings. In 
the direct translation when a technology in a shift of technique from the 
hunter’s-bow becomes the music bow, the interobjecticity is very direct and narrow. 
This (these) object(s) are furthermore related on the horizontal axis to the set 
of tools involved in the makings. The set of tools might be just a knife. But 
with the specialization that occurs in the second paradigm, the relationship 
between set of tools and object becomes increasingly broader. When we think 
of the object as an instrument (rather than a bow), the set of tools expands. 
Planar, saw, drill, chisels, files, hammer, square, compass, as well as glue and 
varnish are now operating at the horizontal axis. Thus, the transformation of 
material is now truly makings of makings in the both axes of the diagram. As 
we move our interest to the third paradigm, this dual direction of making is 
going to broaden as well as deepen. When a technique, as in the ability to play 
the pipe organ, generates a technology, the piano, the interobjecticity operates 
through the human body. “We shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape us.” To 
understand the process involved in the morphogenesis is therefore to study 
figure/ground simultaneously. And therefore our interest in interobjecticity 
Figure 39. 
Diagram of the media 
axis, object/text to 
object/text. 
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becomes to understand the two distinctive channels through which objecticity 
will be sent.  
 
 direct dependency from one technology to another (excorporation) 
 translation through the human body (incorporation) 
 
The first we can understand as direct cause and effect, for example, when some 
object is used in making other objects or when objects are operating in bigger 
networks in which the specific object is directly related to another object. In 
the second distinction, the relationship is not that obvious. Here we have to 
understand that our body changes by the objects that surround it as the 
symbiotic relationship of the protruding behind and its support in Dali’s The 
Enigma of William Tell. The design, with these two channels in mind, allows us 
to continue through the path of design narrative, and find out what wild and 
unpredictable monkey-wrench is heaved into the machinery. And maybe we can toss in a 
couple of our own monkey-wrenches as well. 
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The Car and the Chair 
 
The first channel of direct dependency is found in, for example, the 
development of the car’s driving milieu. This manifests itself not only in the 
extensive set of tools incorporated into the fabrication of a car, but into the 
very design of the driving milieu. The placement and design of features such as 
the steering wheel, the gear shifter, and the gas pedal are dependent on the 
configuration of the car’s motor and transmission. Or, to be more accurate, the 
placement of these features is dependent on the motor and transmission 
configurations of the first generations of cars. The interface of the car is not 
created with the latest technology in mind. Although some aspects of the car’s 
inner workings have radically changed, the driving milieu has pretty much 
stayed the same. In the broader sense, there are little or no differences between 
how we drive, for example, a 1925 model Ford or a new Mercedes. This 
cultural retardation of technique is an interesting phenomenon that I will 
return to later.  
 
The car’s interface is not totally ignorant of the driver’s body; however, the 
logic behind the placements of levers, handles, pulleys, and knobs follows the 
car’s mechanical aspects. Driven by the objecticity, the interface therefore 
appears as the negotiation between the function of the human body and the 
function of the technology. This communication between body and machine is 
direct (sensomobility to objecticity) and cannot be thought of as a semiotic 
construction. The driver is changing the configurations of the motor by muscle 
power. The foot pressing down the gas pedal is transmitted by a system of 
pulleys and levers to a function that releases more gas into the combustion. 
The gas pedal, gear shifter, and steering wheel merge in a direct correlation 
with the motor and transmission. This diagram was the departure point for the 
student investigation Auto-Lingo presented as one of the laboratories in this 
research.71  
 
                                                 
71 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Anthropolog[y]ists.” 
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In order to understand the second channel, form of interobjecticity, we have to 
understand the discussed cycle of how the body (individually and collectively) 
changes (is made) through the usage of objects and how that change later 
informs the making of other objects. 
 
Once again we bring out the chair and the act of sitting to illustrate how this 
works. As pointed out previously, the reason why we might think that the fact 
that the Western way to sit (on chairs) is a completely natural behavior is based 
on a mechanism of symbioses between object and body. The feeling that the 
chair is shaped after how the body wants to sit and how the body is constructed 
to be seated is imprinted by the multitude of chairs that partly constructs our 
socio-corporeal network. However, we have to remember that this way to sit is 
just one of a number of ways to rest the legs yet still be active with the upper 
body. Different societies have developed different sitting 
techniques/technologies. The Etruscans and the Romans liked to position 
themselves half laying in situations where we naturally would sit in a chair 
(figure 41). Chinese and Japanese sit in the lotus position. Indians and Africans 
can squat for hours, a position that only a few Westerners can maintain for a 
small duration of time. I usually ask my design students in Sweden and 
America to squat, often with a very meager result for the group. Only a few in 
the group are able to squat properly (with the heels and toes to the ground) 
and the ones that indeed can squat do not last very long doing so. When I 
asked the same question of my students in Papua New Guinea (figure 40), they 
had no problem to squat for the duration of the class. The problem was, of 
course, that their professor (me) could not squat for this long, so design classes 
were still held in a Western way.  
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This glitch between one sitting-technique and one sitting-technology became 
apparent in a strange way in my furniture design classes in Qatar. My furniture 
class is taught as a woodshop studio where the students’ understanding of 
design is developed in a hands-on-woodshop-tools-techniques-fabrication 
culture. In such a class in Australia, Sweden, Lebanon, Nebraska, and New 
York, the only surface work I executed was on the benches and tables. In 
Qatar, however, some of my Qatari students prefer to sit on the floor. This of 
course radically changes the whole working environment. Different sitting 
postures could even be a source for friction between cultures. Shown in this 
Englishman’s concerns from 1852 about the craftsmen working for him, “All 
work with their knees on a level with their chin: the left hand—when not used 
as the kangaroo uses his tail to form a tripod—grasps the left knee and bind 
the trunk to the double limbs.”72 In his opinion, this way of sitting suggested, 
“indolence and inefficiency… especially irritating to an Englishman.” In an 
attempt to force the workers to work in a more Western way, he bolted the 
anvils to the desks only to find the workers now squatting on the desks. 73 
 
                                                 
72 As quoted in: Cranz, The Chair, 25.  
73 As quoted in: Ibid.  
Figure 40. 
Lik-lik John (Little John) 
is sitting on a rock drying 
himself in the sun, 
Buskap Village, Marobe 
Province of Papua New 
Guinea. 
 
 
Figure 41. 
Sarcophagus of the 
Spouses, Etruscan Villa 
Giulia, Rome. 
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The different style of sitting has little to do with different genetic presets of the 
society. We learn, get molded, to sit. Anybody that has spent any duration of 
time with children can attest that they are not natural chair-sitters. A childhood 
in a Western setting can be thought of as a chair-sitting school. I remember the 
tug-of-war from my childhood between me and the grownups:  
  
In fact we sit babies in chairs before they can even walk. In the highchair the 
little baby is strapped up to sit properly by an exoskeleton structure, before the 
body has gained the strength to sit by itself. To learn to sit “properly,” is a 
physiological process (objecticity to sensomobility) as well as a mental process 
(textuality to sensomobility). The act of sitting changes the body. Configuration 
of muscles, blood vessels, ligaments and joints develops according to the 
different sitting posture. Indeed, the process alters the body slowly and 
gradually. One day we can just sit (properly), and by then we are under the 
assumption that sitting in a chair is an absolute natural behavior and every 
other form of sitting is not. When a culture has selected one preferable way it 
also has to exclude other possible ways, all the structure involved weighs down 
the system with agreements. 
 
Let us take this argument farther; since we (the Western culture) have agreed 
on the chair, all bodies in the culture are going through the same learning 
process, and all our bodies are altered in the same way (collectively we can no 
longer sit any other way), so the chair becomes an object  upon which many 
other objects are based. For example, how we eat is interrelated with how we 
sit. This interobjecticity manifests itself in the design of bowls, plates and 
cutlery, as well as in how the food is prepared and served. It is easy to 
understand that the table and chair-sitting is different from, for example, sitting 
on the floor. We can notice a similar difference between, for instance, Asian 
and Western cooking. Western food is often served in big cuts, while in Asia 
food is served in small pieces. The first is to be divided by the diner himself, 
the latter is already bite size; it makes the difference between the world of knife 
and fork and the world of chopsticks. Eating with knife and fork enables you 
to cut food into pieces, whereas eating with chopsticks requires an already 
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subdivided portion. The chair deeply impacts our tableware as well as our 
kitchen-ware (the act of cooking also differs between the two cultures). But we 
can find other interobjecticities based on the chair, such as how toilets, the 
interiors of cars, and the keyboard instrument are designed. Here the design is 
based totally on the actant—his chair-sitting-body.  
 
A little thought: The water closet (toilet) must be one of the oddest objects ever invented, 
sitting in a position that does not really open up the rectal system fully must seem weird for 
any other culture than ours. In restaurants in New York’s Chinatown, I have many times 
seen the “forbidden to squat on the toilet” signs and in almost every one of those locations 
there are footprints detectable on the top of the toilet seats—the world of chair-sitting-bodies 
meets the world of squat-sitting-bodies. 
 
In the design narrative of string instruments, as described above, we did find 
two channels where interobjecticity was sent. Furthermore, we found three 
paradigms with three different relationships between technique and 
technology, three different ways that drive change. So far, however, we have 
only explored Douglas Adams’s first two technologies: the one “that is in the 
world when you're born is normal” and the one “invented between when you're fifteen and 
thirty-five is new and exciting.” Let us therefore resume the story with Adam’s 
third-level technology which comes about when one is “thirty-five” and “is 
against the natural order of things.”  
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The Ghost of Retardation 
 
A memory: On the first day of school I remember getting a multi-lined notebook. And, 
without an understanding of what it meant, I found myself going through the alphabet 
printing letter by letter into the book. We did not get to start to learn how to read and write 
until all the features were rightly aligned with the lines.        
 
When I write, I used to use the common and widespread sans serif 
typeface, Arial. Sans serif is French and stands for without 
serifs(figure 42), serifs referring to the small perpendicular dashes that end the 
strokes of the letters in antique typefaces, as in, for example, Garamond.(the 
typeface this text is written with) I always use Arial when I am writing a longer 
text.  This is a highly personal decision—a habit I somehow picked up with no 
rational explanation. I could tell you that I find it easier to read on the screen, 
but, ultimately, I am just more comfortable with it. I know that I am free to 
change typeface, from the sans serif Arial to a classic Times New Roman and 
back again by a few clicks on the mouse anytime I want. It takes only a couple 
of seconds. This ease in which we can make the choice of text style, however, 
is rather novel. 
 
Until the Renaissance, copying text was a tedious act. The texts had to be 
transferred painstakingly by hand, letter by letter, word by word. The 
introduction of movable types (Johann Gutenberg around 145074), ultimately 
changed the whole act of printing, leading to a more effective printing process. 
In this transformation a new profession emerged—the graphic designer. 
Because types could now be produced in series and reused time and again, 
more time could be spent on the design of every individual typeface. This also 
led to a new freedom in shaping the individual letters. Due to this, one might 
think, an explosion of new forms would occur in which typefaces such as the 
simple Arial and more complex fonts should quickly emerge, but this was not 
the case. It took about 300 years for anything like the sans serif typefaces to 
                                                 
74 Meggs and Purvis, Meggs’ History of Graphic Design, 61. 
88 
 
emerge with force.75 And when it happened it was through a fierce resistance 
and commotion as one of the sans serif font’s given epithet—grotesques76—
indicates. 
 
 
 
Why was that? What mechanism retards development in culture? In order to 
comprehend this, let us define some of the rules that constitute the letter 
shapes. The shapes given to the individual letters in a phonetic alphabet can be 
thought of as almost completely arbitrary. This is also true for a letter’s 
correlating sound. This is not true in a pictographic system—the Chinese sign 
system for instance—where a line configuration represents a whole word 
which can be traced back to a figurative representation. In our alphabet, 
however, the shape does not correlate with what it represents. For example, 
the configuration of lines on this paper of the letter A has nothing to do with 
the phonetic sound of an A. Originally the sound of A could have been 
represented by the shapes of say D or H or T or maybe by completely 
alternative shapes, for example ¤. Or the other way around, the shape of A 
could have represented an altogether different sound. In my childhood, as a 
game, we made up languages performed with alternation of some of the most 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 130. 
76 Ibid. 
Figure 42. 
Sans serif typeface, Arial. 
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common letters. For example change all the S’s to T’s and vice versa and the 
sentence “I wrote this letter” becomes “I wrose shit lesser.” Some practice of 
this gives a secret language.  
 
Another example of this arbitrariness of the letter’s sounds is exposed in the 
English language “ghoti” phenomenon. The argument here is that the word 
fish could phonetically be spelled “ghoti” with the [gh] from "laugh," the [o] 
from "women" and the [ti] from "nation." These two examples show the very 
crux in the usage of a phonetic alphabet—it is based on common agreements. 
This means even if the shapes and sounds of letters were originally given by 
chance, they become arbitrarily fixed; we construct agreements on the given 
shapes and sounds. Once the users in a system have started to agree on these 
entities, they become, if not static, at least more durable. In daily life one 
cannot on a whim change the shapes and sounds of the alphabet, an A is an A.  
 
Since we have now established a few rules, let us go back to the serifs. Where 
do they come from? Who established the serifs? And why were they 
established? I am going to ignore the widely held view that they developed in 
order to help focus on long strands of text in a written document; enhancing 
readability and legibility by helping the readers discriminate the ends of letters. 
The fact that the serifs enhance readability might be true, (even if one has to 
raise certain skepticism of the evidence supporting this argument77). Regardless 
if this argument holds water or not, the serifs’ origin has a completely different 
explanation. Let us first figure out in which technology and which technique 
the serifs came about.  
 
After a long period of regressed importance in the medieval era, the serifs were 
not born but reintroduced by the establishment of the new printing technology 
of the Renaissance. They had already been invented in Roman times, not from 
                                                 
77 Can we read text with serifs more easily because it is more readable, or because serif texts are more common 
so we are used to reading text with serifs and therefore find it easier? You answer that one for yourself. 
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the act of printing on paper, but from the act of cutting stone (figure 43).78 
The fact that they were written in stone and, therefore, were transmitted by a 
durable objecticity were one of the very reasons the serifs survived.  
 
That the serif was born in the media of stone is important for understanding 
how our ghost operates, because when we change media from paper back to 
stone, the seemingly decorative little serif becomes not just highly functional, 
but also derived from a completely different set of tools, in an altogether 
different interobjecticity. To say that stone and paper, here, are two altogether 
different media is an understatement. A change in media (on which we are 
printing) alters the whole act of printing. Stone performs differently, demands 
different tools, and generates different skills; the pen or the movable type of 
the paper translates to the hammer and the chisel; the smooth surface 
application of ink or lead translates to the deep heavy-duty removal of material.  
 
                                                 
78 Meggs and Purvis, Meggs’ History of Graphic Design, 36. 
Figure 43. 
Roman typeface, 
Coloseum, Rome. 
 
Figure 44. 
Serif typeface, 
Garamond. 
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Like Chiseled in Paper 
 
A design narrative speculation: Picture yourself with a chisel and a hammer carving the 
letter “I,” the easiest one (because regardless of your factual skills as a stone mason we have 
to think of you as a beginner in this experiment) in, say, a piece of marble. The chisel traces 
the lines you have already marked upon the surface with a brush. For every inch worth of line 
it takes a good series of hits with the hammer upon the chisel and you’re breaking a sweat as 
the work progresses. Finally you are in the end of the line, just a little more and your work 
would be done. Suddenly an accident happens, maybe the chisel misses its target or the stone 
keeps on cracking beyond the end-point of the line. So close but yet…  Okay, that was not a 
glorious moment, let us start over. This time turn your chisel 90 degrees and make two small 
chisel length scores in both endpoints of your line. These scores will prevent the stone from 
cracking. And this is the very moment when the serif is (was) born.  
 
There is another theory that argues that serif is a trace of a brush technique. 
Before the stones were cut, the letterforms were drawn on the surface with a 
flat brush. In order to mark the end of the line the signwriter thickened the end 
of the lines.79 However, I hold it as more probable that the serif is the imprint 
of the first perpendicular chisel cuts. Even if the brushstroke came first, the 
chisel modified the design.80 If so, it is a direct interobjecticity, the serif (the 
object, sign) is an index of the chisel (the tool), primarily there to prevent the 
stone from cracking, not to please the eye or increase readability. The serifs are 
traces of a technique coming out of stone-cutting technology. But the birth 
moment of the serifs alone does not explain how a Roman stonecutting 
specter survives to become an important feature in the Renaissance technology 
of movable types. Why did the serifs become trendy again? To comprehend this 
we have to understand a rather complex and deep interobjecticity. So far we 
have seen the linkage through both physical and mental structures, as for 
example in the highchair (physical) and the Sit properly! (mental). A similar dual 
structure is essential for the understanding of the serif’s survival. To explain 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 Drucker and McVarish, Graphic Design History, 38. 
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this we have to place ourselves in the era in which the serifs were 
reintroduced—the Renaissance, more precisely the Italian Renaissance. 
 
 
Although a time of great technical advancement, the Renaissance was, as the 
name indicates, (Renaissance, from ri- "again" and nascere "be born")81 a time heavily 
focused on historical studies. The “forgotten” knowledge of the Classical era 
was to be regained, and scholars, philosophers, and scientists sought answers in 
Classical Greek and Roman writing and thinking. In architecture, studies of 
Roman ruins generated new buildings such as The Tempietto by Donato 
Bramante. This was published in treatises like Sebastiano Serlio’s Seven Books of 
Architecture (I sette libri dell'architettura) and Andrea Palladio’s Four books of 
architecture (I Quattro Libri dell'Architettura). The same archeological interest 
influenced artists like Donatello and Michelangelo. The Italian Renaissance was 
certainly a time when—the textuality of—good, true, and proper was defined by 
the signs of antique Rome and Greece. This was, indeed, true for graphic 
design too. So, surviving on the stone of Rome’s ruins (the physical construct) 
and in the fashion of the time (the mental construct), the serifs not only 
endured but gained dominance.  
 
Pioneers of the new printing technology such as Nicolas Jenson modeled 
letterforms directly and indirectly after the capital letters were found on Roman 
ruins.82 On monuments such as the Column of Trajan, Jenson found 
precedents for his graphic design. The form of the serif can here be interpreted 
as a sign (representing a regained classical beauty) and the serif has turned into 
a highly decorative graphical detail since the concern is the shape rather than 
the function. In this linkage the object became a sign and this sign became an 
object. 
 
                                                 
81 Douglas Harper, “Online Etymology Dictionary.” 
82 Cramsie, The Story of Graphic Design, 85–6. 
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But there is another aspect of this transformation of interest for us. Due to 
developments in writing taking place after the making of the Column of 
Trajan, Jensen and his contemporaries were faced with a fascinating aesthetic 
problem. Today we are used to sentences fabricated by two forms of every 
letter—the uppercase and the lowercase—where the lowercase is used in the 
bulk of the text and the uppercase is used to mark the beginning of sentences. 
This principle was not in use during Roman times.83 In fact the Romans did 
not have lowercase letters at all. Roman writing was done with uppercase 
letters with no space and punctuation between sentences. The lowercase letters 
were developed during the medieval era, the ninth century Caroline minuscule,84 
deriving from the Roman uppercase. This development can, once again, be 
understood as a shift of technology becoming a new technique. The lowercase 
is optimized for handwriting. Their round shapes are easier to print which 
saves time.85 The serif-less Caroline minuscule, or its descendant in Jensen’s time 
the littera antique, did not have specific uppercase letters but used the Roman 
classical letters with serifs. The shapes of the lowercase with serifs had to be 
invented, fabricated by adding a stonecutting feature to a handwriting feature.86 
The result is a copy without an existing original—a simulacrum. Jensen and his 
contemporaries way of creating typefaces after Roman models became 
standard; a standard still in use. We can still see traces from the ancient 
stonecutter’s tools on our computer screens today in an interobjecticity that 
spans at least two thousand years. 
 
Finally, we are back to the question prompted by the choice of typeface. Why 
did it take so long for the san serifs to develop after the appearance of the 
printing press? Since this is a design narrative and only a speculation, please 
feel free to disagree with my answer to this question.  
                                                 
83 Drucker and McVarish, Graphic Design History, 40. 
84 Cramsie, The Story of Graphic Design, 54. 
85 Meggs and Purvis, Meggs’ History of Graphic Design, 41, 46–7. 
86 Cramsie, The Story of Graphic Design, 65. Quotation: “He [Jensen] diligently sought out the best examples of 
incised capitals and littera antigua and then adapted them so expertly…” 
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The Ghost of Numbers 
 
In order for a system of many users such as the alphabet to be functional, the 
agreements concerning its highly arbitrary shapes have to be kept and 
governed carefully. The A cannot be allowed to change to a D or an H or a T 
or a ¤ every morning, every year, or even every new generation. This is fairly 
easy to comprehend. Modern society is built on the agreement of language, and 
without the maintenance of these agreements, directions, rules, laws and 
contracts become void. As a matter of fact, due to this verbal arbitrariness 
(written and spoken) the systems based on textuality are very costly to 
maintain. The maintenance of the alphabet is dependent on didactic systems 
such as lexicons, dictionaries, spell-check on your computer, academic boards 
and schooling.  
 
But that does not cover the question of serif or sans serif. Or does it? What is 
it that constitutes the agreed shape of each letter? Let us further examine the 
uppercase A; it demonstrates an interesting point. How much of the initial A-
shape do we need to maintain for it to still be an A  As we can see the bar in 
the middle has no function, unless we have a problem of mirroring letters 
horizontally (in which case you will confuse it with a V). (It is notable that the 
A in the Roman typeface capitalis rustica saved space on expensive papyrus by 
removing the mid bar.87) But we do not seem to have any problems with 
mirroring in the case of the M and the W. Thus, the mid bar appears to be 
totally redundant; we can remove it any time and still understand it as a distinct 
shape. So why does that not happen? Kevin Kelly argues in New Rules for the 
New Economy that the more users there are in a communication system the 
more useful the system is—the law of plentitude.88 But if the usefulness of a 
system is due to how many are agreeing upon it, the usefulness also states how 
durable it is—the bigger a system the slower it changes. This is due to the fact 
that any change of agreements has to be accepted by a larger number of 
                                                 
87 Meggs and Purvis, Meggs’ History of Graphic Design, 36. 
88 Kelly, New Rules for the New Economy, 39–49. 
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people. Large systems by nature operate in large viscosity. And the alphabet is 
indeed a large system. So the simple explanation is: once we have agreed on the 
shapes of the letters, redundant or not, the agreement—technique—sticks.  
 
Furthermore, I also believe that we can understand this increasing cultural 
viscosity from the viewpoint of a second category of interobjecticity—as a 
translation through the human body. In this case we can go back to the 
argument of the plastic brain and that the latest neuroscience has shown that 
the idea that “We shape our tools and thereafter our tools shape us” 89 
operates in a neurological sense, too. One of the most common arguments for 
the serifs is that they are believed to increase readability. There are some 
studies supporting this theory. This can be interpreted as if the serifs contain 
some qualities helping human vision. On the other hand, a just as likely 
interpretation is that since the classical typeface still is the predominant system, 
most of the texts we read use classical typefaces (a quick view in my bookshelf 
confirms this—out of the 10 novels I examined first, all of them were written 
in serifs). We simply learn how to read the classical typefaces, a lesson that 
generates structures in the brain, which gives the reading of the classical 
typefaces an edge.  
 
It seems that there is a time around the birth of a technology when it is easy to 
introduce an argument to be agreed on (the serifs reintroduction on the 
uppercase letter and its invention on the lowercase letters), but once the system 
of users becomes too large there is an inherent resistance for change and the 
technique becomes cemented (as in the resistance of the introduction of san 
serifs). 
                                                 
89 McLuhan and Lapham, Understanding Media, xi. 
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The Jam in the Machinery 
 
Let us see how this works in a highly related introduction of a new 
technology—the typewriter and its QWERTY keyboard. QWERTY keyboard 
is, by far, the most used keyboard in Western culture; named by the six upper 
left letters: Q, W, E, R, T and Y. This configuration is probably what you are 
used to typing on and what you have on your own computer. The innovation 
of the typewriter was, as a lot of innovations, rather a slow evolution of one 
object to another. In 1714, Henry Mill was granted a patent by Queen Anne 
for, in his own words, "an artificial machine or method for the impressing or 
transcribing of letters singly or progressively one after another, as in writing, 
whereby all writing whatever may be engrossed in paper or parchment so neat 
and exact as not to be distinguished from print.”90 We do not know how 
Mills’s machine worked. It is lost. And so is another of the pioneering 
machines, Pellegrino Terri’s from circa 1808—only documents written by it 
remain. These machines were followed by a series of different solutions to the 
operation of printing types manually. All of which have different concepts of 
how to interface the mechanism of movable types to the human hand. None 
of these had any great success. It was not until the “Remington No 2” 
typewriter was released in 1878 by the gun maker E. Remington and Sons that 
we could see an object that starts to generate enough plentitude to be 
understood as a cultural network. And Remington was using the QWERTY 
design.  
 
The QWERTY design came about a couple of years earlier; it was patented in 
1868 by Christopher Latham Sholes, a Milwaukee publisher, politician and 
philosopher. His machine was manufactured by Remington in1873. There are 
different theories why the QWERTY configuration came about. It has been 
suggested that Sholes’ pre-runner to the Remington No 2 was developed 
specifically for the American Telegraph.91 And the configuration was 
                                                 
90 As quoted in: Baines and Haslam, Type and Typography, 96. 
91 Yasuoka  Koichi and Yasuoka, Motoko, “On the Prehistory of QWERTY.” 
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developed to suit the needs of a telegrapher receiving American Morse Code. 
Another school of thought implies that the configuration is to suit the inner 
mechanics of the typewriter or even slow the typing down so it would not 
jam92 by placing the keys for the most used letters in, for the hand, odd 
positions, the technology would be able to keep up with the technique. Since 
the Remington became the standard typewriter, the QWERTY design became 
the standard interface, which then generated a whole new network of linked 
artifacts, bodies, and languages. Institutions such as educational systems, 
companies, manufacturers, political bodies, and governmental and municipal 
organizations became linked (and still are linked) by this interface. This linkage 
is to be understood as a bottom to top relationship where the different parts 
are holding together laterally and vertically. The QWERTY configuration did 
not only become one of many typewriter designs possible, but came to 
represent the very idea of a typewriter. 
 
Assume that there was an option that made us type faster. Would you not want 
to be able to optimize the usage of your computer? After all we are spending 
more and more time maintaining our daily lives through typing: shopping 
online, learning new languages, writing letters, finding addresses, making 
reservations, doing research, etc. So speeding up our writing on the keyboard 
would really save a lot of time. Would not a new configuration of keys be 
successful if it could prove that it would be time saving? Something like this 
should not be hard to do since the QWERTY system was, after all, designed 
for an old technique or an old technology—the telegraph or the typewriter that 
jammed—not the fast electronic computer. And is it not so (in a free market) 
that new and better products automatically replace old products?  
                                                 
92 Hoffer, “The Dvorak Keyboard.” 
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In reality, as you might be aware, other options exist such as the Dvorak 
keyboard (figure 45). Designed by August Dvorak and William Dealey in the 
1920s and 1930s, it has a more user-friendly configuration claimed93 to be 
faster than the older QWERTY keyboard. We just have to learn how to use it. 
But there is the catch. We do not really live in a free market. We exist in a 
QWERTY defined world. It was likely that the first keyboard you ever used 
and learned to write on was a QWERTY one. And even if you, against all 
odds, first learned to type in a world of Dvorak, you soon found yourself 
engulfed by the QWERTY world. Anytime you want to borrow a computer or 
a typewriter it is likely to have the older configuration, which forces you to 
learn the QWERTY on top of your knowledge of the Dvorak, something 
masters of typewriting might manage to do but not the common masses. 
QWERTY is the agreement that has generated a technique that has been a 
standard for more than one hundred years. As well as writing this dissertation 
in an Arial typeface, I wrote it on a QWERTY keyboard. When the new 
computer technology was introduced it just adapted the old keyboard 
technique without any friction, as the interface of the new car accepts the old 
configurations. 
 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
Figure 45. 
Dvorak keyboard 
configuration. 
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This is the reason for why we drive modern cars almost the same way as we 
drove old cars, steering wheel, gas pedal, clutch and gearstick.  The interface 
design of the modern car would not need to be shaped as it is based on the 
inner objecticity of the engine. The difference between the inner working of a 
new Mercedes to a 1925 model Ford is to be compared with the difference 
between the “Remington No 2” typewriter and your computer. However, the 
viscosity of the structure holds it back. There are studies that show that there 
might be faster and safer ways to design interfaces between the driver and the 
car, such as for example the feature used for playing computer games, the 
joystick. The car manufacturer Mercedes has actually made a concept car 
presented at the Paris Motor Show in 1996 that is driven with a joystick(figure 
46).94 However, the joystick interface is meeting the same societal resistance as 
the computer keyboard did. It has a similar low adaptability to the dominant 
socio-corporeal didactic structure. It is not a free market! How are you going to 
sell a car like that? What second-hand value is it likely to have? Because the 
interface of the car, as the QWERTY keyboard, lives in a huge network the 
                                                 
94 “1996 Mercedes-Benz F 200 Imagination Concept.” 
Figure 46. 
Illustration of the driving 
milieu of the Mercedes-
Benz F 200 concept car. 
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third of Douglas Adams categories of technology is very much at work here: 
Anything invented after you're thirty-five is against the natural order of things.” 
95 There is a chance that a new generation of computer game players would 
buy and drive a joystick car; however, there is a whole segment of the market 
that are born, raised, schooled and imprinted with the old steering wheel.  
 
However, in the examples with the QWERTY keyboard, the serif typeface and 
the car’s driving interface, we find a technique that is so strong that the 
technology has to, if not stand still, move slowly and carefully around it. As 
when the first piano adapted the technique of playing the pipe organ—a 
technique still visible in the player piano in the hotel lobby—to the technology 
of the piano.  
 
                                                 
95 Adams, The Salmon of Doubt, 95. 
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The Fourth Paradigm – And the Story Goes On  
 
So we are back where we started, a hotel lobby somewhere (one of thousands like it). A pair 
of invisible hands becomes detectable in the moving keys, as a shadow, as an index, the ghost 
in the machinery, the ghost of the player piano. 
 
By detecting the technique of the virtual piano player, how he configures, and 
reconfigures the keys, we can understand that the technique has not changed 
much in between the piano and the player piano in the lobby.  However, the 
technology supporting this technique is profoundly changed. The piano is 
transformed by adding punch-card technology. This technology, developed for 
controlling mechanical looms in France at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
atomizes and controls the musical fabrication. The punch card technology can 
be understood as a forerunner of the computer. It can store and transfer 
information. With this shift, we have entered a new paradigm—the 
information society. Now music could be recorded, sold, and replayed in large 
quantities, subsequently freeing the music from a direct body to object (hand 
to keyboard) relationship. The process of freeing the music from the musician 
(like the typeface was freed from the medium) did not happen quickly. 
 
As we have noticed, culture fabrication has a level of viscosity. Shifts of 
technologies are not necessarily follow by rapid shifts of techniques and shifts 
of techniques are not necessarily followed by rapid shifts of technology. 
Although the music on the first recording devices for the player piano was 
transferred by technicians from original music scores, it still had to be 
composed and arranged. And this was still done by a musician, a pianist. The 
music played by the lobby player piano is still made by a piano player—a 
musician who still sees the world through his “cultural classes”:the piano and 
the body, two hands on a keyboard. Therefore, indexes of both his hands 
appear in the keyboard, linking the hunters bow to the birth of information 
technology through a strange but beautiful dance of technique and technology.  
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But the narrative does not end there. There is at least one more twist of the 
story. In 1947 the Mexican American, composer Conlon Nancarrow aquired 
an Ampico Reproducing Piano and the hole-punching equipment for pianola 
rolls. Nancarrow, not a piano player himself, was fed up by musicians unable 
to perform his compositions. Nancarrow thereby bypassed the playing of the 
keyboard and created an altogether new interface between the instrument and 
the body. The music now produced has nothing to do with what a human can 
play on a piano; it has to do with what one can produce from the punch card, 
an altogether new technique. Nancarrow died in 1997 but his music is still 
available and bears witness to the invention’s abilities. It might seem that 
Nancarrow finally exorcised our old ghost from the piano, but, it only moved, 
changed configuration, from the keyboard to the hole-punching equipment. It 
is said that Nancarrow developed thick forearms96 using the old equipment. It takes strength 
to fight a ghost. 
 
                                                 
96 Rodwell, “Conlon Nancarrow.” 
Figure 47. 
The punch holl role of a 
player piano as showed 
by Reg Richings at the 
ReStore, Ealing London. 
 
Figure 48. 
Changing the punch hole 
roll of a player piano as 
showed by Reg Richings 
at the ReStore, Ealing 
London. 
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Observations and Continuation 
 
We have seen how operations of transformation and translations are driven, 
retarded, and governed by shifts of techniques or/and shifts of technologies. 
We have understood that societal transformations and translations can operate 
with different viscosity; makings keep making. The world of stuff and stuff is 
heavily interlinked and these linkages in-between different makings can both 
slow down and speed up progress and change. Design operates with an 
understanding of how interlinked structures operate; how objecticitive, 
textualitive, and sensomobilitive statements construct a complex narrative of 
interobjecticity and intertextuality. In order to do so, design—the art of 
makings of makings—had to develop, and has also had to develop qualitative 
analytical tools where various types of linkages are understood.  
 
In the last Part, Creativity, we are going to further penetrate structures of 
linkage in symbiotic systems of making by focusing on the human, the maker. 
The attempt here is to understand what makes us able to make and to form 
these strong relationships with the made; how do we construct narratives of 
statements of objecticity, textuality, and sensomobility. 
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The World of Intro and Exo 
 
The stuff and stuff we utilize for our daily lives can really be seen as an external 
bodyfication of material or as an exoskeleton, as Manual De Landa states it: 
“About eight thousand years ago, human population began mineralization 
again when they developed an urban exoskeleton. Bricks of sun dried clay 
become the building materials for their homes.”97 The exact date when we 
consider humans began producing exoskeletal structures can, of course, be 
debated. The De Landa dating is referring to architecture, specifically the 
architecture of the city, as the first exoskeleton. If we instead mean the first 
tools that we have found, we have to push back the date, maybe so far as to 2.5 
million years ago.98 This is when homo habilis (skillful man—one of our ancestors 
or close relatives) was walking the savannas of Africa. If we include art as an 
exoskeletal structure—an exo-nervous or exo-synaptic structure—we find 
indications of abstract works of art in Africa from about 70,00099 years ago. All 
these dates are arbitrary, however, since it is hard to link the findings of objects 
to the skeletal findings that we can carbon date. Whichever way we see the 
prehistory of makings, we know that humans at points in our prehistory did 
start to build dwellings, shape tools, and produce works of art.  
 
We have in the previous parts discussed how our world of stuff and stuff is kept 
together by statements. In some makings, these statements create agreements 
so strong that we develop a symbiotic relationship with the made. We have 
                                                 
97 Landa and Landa, A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History, 26–27. 
Extended Quote: “…soft tissue (gels and aerosols, muscle and nerve) reigned supreme until 500 million 
years ago. At that point, some of the conglomerations of fleshy matter-energy that made up life 
underwent a sudden mineralization, and a new material for constructing creatures emerged: bone… the 
vertebra column, made new forms of movement control possible… the human endoskeleton was one of 
the many products of that ancient mineralization. Yet it is not the only geological infiltration that the 
human species has undergone.  About eight thousand years ago, human population began 
mineralization again when they developed an urban exoskeleton. Bricks of sun dried clay become the 
building materials for their homes,” 
 
98 Renfrew, Prehistory, 48. 
99 the Blombos cave ochre South Africa  
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found that these statements can take different forms and be transmitted in 
different channels (objecticity, textuality, and sensomobility). In this last part, 
the attempt is to expand on our theoretical model by further exploring: 
 What structures enables us, as individuals and as a society, to make? 
 What makes us able to alter, utilize, and navigate the world of the 
made? 
 What does the made make us? 
 
Some of these questions we have already touched on in the previous parts. 
However, most observations so far have been based how things work, rather 
than why things work. The intention here is to go deeper and further; to start 
to speculate about cognitive structures needing makings; and to discuss how 
we can attach ourselves to technology—how techniques are formed. In Part I, 
we discussed the symbiotic relationships between the body and its 
surroundings. In an attempt to understand how this operates, it would be 
beneficial to take a look at how we perceive the body and how we understand 
the division between the living body and the dead object. 
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Life a Making 
 
The ability to make does not make us unique in the animal kingdom. Other 
species have learned to utilize similar external tracks, makings outside the body, 
to enhance their chances of survival. Bird nests, coral reefs, beaver dams, 
hornet nests, anthills, and termite nests are all examples of exoskeletal 
structures. Mammals, like the otter100, use tools in the form of stones to crack 
shells. Crickette Sanz and David Morgan, principal investigators of the 
Goualougo Triangle Ape Project in northern Republic of Congo, have studied 
the complex tool usage of termite hunting chimpanzees.101 The chimpanzees 
not only shape wooden sticks, but they craft two distinctive forms of tools, one 
pointy stick to break into the termite nest, and one brush-like stick to fish out 
the termites. Sometimes animal makings take on artistic-like expressions, such 
as elaborate dances and songs. The Red Kite embellishes its nest elaborately, 
sometimes stealing from humans. This is a habit Shakespeare acknowledges in 
The Winter's Tale, “When the kite builds, look to lesser linen.” 102 Some animals 
can be picky when it comes to artistic taste. Australian Bowerbirds decorate 
their nests with only objects that are of the color blue.  
 
In most cases these animal behaviors are seen as expressions of instinctive 
knowledge. The beaver builds its dam; the otter uses the rock; the ants collect 
millions of small objects to build a stack; the Paradise Bird of Papua New 
Guinea dances elaborate mating dances; and the Bowerbird collects blue 
objects to decorate its nest, because it is in their DNA to do so. The 
transmission from one generation to the next—the external making and the 
internal making—is communicated through the same channel, the genetic 
code. Thus the rulework of making can be seen from a purely genetic 
perspective. So how do we place human creativity here? In many respects, we are 
animals ruled by a similar set of biological rules as the rest of all living things. 
                                                 
100 Povinelli, Folk Physics for Apes, 73. 
101 Sanz and Morgan, The Mind of the Chimpanzee, 130. 
102 Web page: ARKive Images of the World http://www.arkive.org/red-kite/milvus-milvus/#text=All 
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As the Nobel Prize laureate, Eric Kandel, expresses it: “All life, including the 
substrate of our thoughts and memories are composed of the same building 
blocks.”103 However, there are certain differences between how animals and 
humans build, dance, and sing. For starters, no other species of animal utilizes 
external makings on the same scale, with the impact, with the plentitude, and 
with the dependents that humans do. Our makings have made it possible for 
us to inhabit extreme conditions from the poles to the equator on this planet. 
The questions are: In which sense does human making differ from, in which sense is it 
similar to, the makings of other animals? And ultimately what do makings make us?  
 
Although, our interest here is primarily human the maker it might be of value 
to briefly discuss makings in a broader sense, as it would give us some clue to 
how we can perceive the act of makings. Life is a constant alteration, a 
constant transformation, of matter and as such we can see it as a form of a 
perpetual making. There are a few theories on how innate matter originally 
took the form of life on this planet. All of these theories operate by similar 
ruleworks. Billions of years ago, basic molecules started to form and reproduce 
into larger interlinking structures—organisms. Regardless of where these larger 
structures originally came about, and what they were based on, life on Earth 
has settled around carbon and hydrogen as its primary building blocks.  
 
From the start, the process of life operated out of a basic set of laws or 
conditions that are still very much in place today. Life depends on and is 
controlled by:  
 
 availability of energy sources 
 availability of raw materials  
 ability of metabolism  
 ability of replication 
 
                                                 
103 Kandel, In Search of Memory, 236. 
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Energy source—It takes energy to reconfigure molecular structures. A motor in 
the form of an available energy source is needed. The sun, or the exchange 
between the Earth’s hot inner core and its cooler surface, operates as a motor 
and enables, directly or indirectly, all forms of life on Earth. Raw material—The 
active molecular structures need access to plenty of free and suitable raw 
material. Earth has plenty of free or semi-free carbon and hydrogen available 
to re-configure. Carbon, together with hydrogen, has the ability to form long, 
flexible and durable strands. These strands are the basic structure for life on 
Earth. Metabolism— Life depends on a process in which raw material can be 
transformed into suitable building blocks; the breaking down of carbon 
compounds into basic building blocks is essential for living organisms on this 
planet. Replication— Organisms must have the ability to generate innumerable 
copies of themselves. A mechanism that directs the same process over and 
over again is essential as a control device for cluster growth. The gene is such a 
code. Life consists of entities that are propelled from an external energy source 
repeatedly making and unmaking molecular clusters. Now these conditions 
can be understood as generating internal (body), as well as external (out of 
body) transformations; therefore, the transformation caused by life is not 
exclusive to organic matter alone.  
 
If we understand life as a constant transformation, it does not seem sufficient 
to limit this understanding to only the tissue of living organisms. Organisms 
change their living environment just by their presence. For example, plants on 
our planet transform carbon dioxide by binding the carbon and freeing oxygen 
into the atmosphere. The mix of gases in the Earth’s atmosphere consequently 
depends on Earth’s plant life. The life on the planet is then directly dependent 
on the right mixture of gases in the atmosphere. This and other such 
interrelationships led the environmentalist, James Lovelock, to develop the 
Gaia Principle or Gaia Theory.104 In this principle, Lovelock sees the whole 
planet Earth—organic and inorganic matter—as one self-regulating complex 
system, almost as if the Earth is one single living organism.  
                                                 
104 Lovelock, Gaia. 
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The scale and scope of the Gaia Principle is, of course, a little too ambitious to 
suit us here. We are, as stated, primarily interested in makings related to 
humans. Lovelock’s attempt, however, shows us that there are theories where 
the clean split between living and nonliving is questioned. As a designer, I find 
myself frequently trying to operate in this fuzzy region. I have in the two 
previous sections already touched upon three theoretical concepts—Richard 
Dawkins’ meme, Marshal McLuhan’s media, and Bruno Latour’s actants—that 
navigate this zone. In order to understand and situate my own praxis, I have 
found these three concepts useful. Permit me, therefore, to insert my makings 
into these concepts.  The intention is not to fully explain or defend these three 
concepts and all their underlying applications, but to reflect on my praxis. 
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Three Aspects, Three Labs 
In these three concepts, meme, media, and actants, generated from three different 
fields of study—biology, media studies, and anthropology—I have found 
similar cores. They all explore the boundaries, the relationships, between man 
and surroundings; organic and inorganic; life and nonlife. Dawkins argues that 
replication, generation, transformation and survival of artifacts, concepts and 
phenomenon follow similar principles to Darwin’s natural selection; i.e. the 
rulework of the meme mirrors the genetic evolutionary rulework. Inert matter 
and abstract concepts become, in interaction with life, lifelike. Their survival 
depends on the availability of energy sources, raw materials, and their metabolism and 
the ability to replicate. Let us test the concept of the meme by inserting it into 
the Piecemeal Meal laboratory (figure 49 and 50). The design narrative here 
becomes a study of the survival of the fittest in societies in the form of food. 
 
 
Figure 49.  
By its nesting, the 
Piecemeal Meal trays 
creates a rulework, 
directing the order of 
what can be served and 
when it can be served. 
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In Dawkins’ world, aspects such as portions of food, cooking techniques, 
recipes, eating habits, eating postures and how food is cut and presented can all 
be thought of as replicators, or memes. The success of these memes, similar to 
the success of genes, is based on their fitness to the environment—their 
society. The Piecemeal trays are designed to fit into Lebanese society (the 
restaurants of Lebanon). As a meme we can think of them as a corporeal 
manifestation of the Lebanese dinner’s rulework.105 However, although, the 
meme is formed by, born out of, a given situation, it is not necessarily limited 
to this situation. Once developed, memes can spread, similar to how a string of 
genes spread. Sometime this is a slow process, as for example, when genes for 
lactose tolerance spread throughout a population. Sometimes this is a rapid 
genetic process, such as when a species migrates to another biotope. Propelled 
by technology or/and techniques (see previous chapter), the distribution of 
memes follows the same principles. Sometimes they bring slow alterations, as 
when slang finds its way into the common language, and sometimes memes 
cause radical changes, for example, the rapid changes brought on by the 
introduction of the laptop computer. Furthermore, replicators, memes and 
genes alike, are not only simple survivors; they alter the rules of the game.  
 
                                                 
105 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Piecemeal Meal.” 
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The foundation of Dawkins’ argument is a perspective where the genes, not 
the carrier, are central to the forces of evolution. Evolution is then not a top-
down system based on the organism, but a bottom to top system; i.e. the genes 
do not exist for the organism’s survival, the organism exists for the genes’ 
survival.“[T]hey go by the name of genes, and we are their survival 
machines.”106 This rather radical principle, Dawkins calls the selfish gene. Applied 
                                                 
106 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 19–20. Extended quote: “what was to be the fate of the ancient replicators? 
They did not die out, for they are past masters of the survival arts. But do not look for them floating loose in the 
sea; they gave up their freedom long ago. Now they swarm in huge colonies, safe inside gigantic lumbering 
robots, sealed off from the outside world, communicating with it by tortuous indirect routes, manipulating it by 
remote control. They are in you and in me; they created us, body and mind; and their preservation is the ultimate 
rationale for our existence. They have come a long way those replicators. Now they go by the name of genes, 
and we are their survival machines”. 
 
Figure 50.  
A superimposed 
Lebanese meze, in the 
actually act there is a 
succession of the 
servings. 
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on the meme it has some clever insights. We can see societies from the 
perspective of the made (the meme). Given that the made has replicator 
abilities, society becomes a way for the made to survive as much as a society 
survives by the made. We can understand this by continuing our design 
narrative. Let us place the Piecemeal trays in an alternative act, say, a Western 
dinner. In this new situation, the trays would still carry out (excuse the pun) the 
inner rulework and replicate a social pattern, meme, into the new situation. 
What could be the hypothetical outcome of this insertion? If the new meme 
survives, it is possible that it would also gain some dominance. Social rituals 
and etiquette, as well as recipes for foods and the design of silverware and 
tabletops would, in this scenario, have to adjust to the selfish meme of the trays. 
Now we cannot understand the survival of a meme from a solely human 
perspective. Regardless what we might believe, new ideas and concepts do not 
necessarily spread because they benefit us. Survival and domination can be 
achieved and maintained in a number of different ways. Remember how the 
QWERTY keyboard, configured to slow down the interaction between man and machine, 
survived and regenerated into later technology. The meme survives by its fitness 
to the rulework regardless of where this fit might be found in the system. 
Moreover the new meme would alter the rulework into which it was 
introduced.  
 
Furthermore, media as an extension of the human senses gives the physical and 
psychological environment similar lifelike attributes as the meme. We have 
already seen the chair becoming an almost body-like extension of the 
individual, thus operating in the physic/physiognomic, as well as the 
sociological sense. The laboratory of the Bre[a]king Making Chair 107attempts to 
operate in both of these aspects(figure 51-53). In order to illustrate this, allow 
me, again, to make the hypothetical leap of a design narrative. Think of a world 
where all chairs follow the principle of the Bre[a]king Making Chair. In this odd 
place, chairs get “tired” when you sit in them. Sitting in this world becomes a 
less passive act. The physiognomic body in this biotope would therefore differ. 
                                                 
107 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Bre[a]king Making Chair.” 
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Ligament and muscles would connect joints differently. By the same token, the 
rulework in this world of easily tired chairs would impact the very way social 
acts would be conducted. Meeting rooms, classrooms, restaurants and loci alike 
would be utilized differently. Schedules of meetings would have to be adjusted 
to fit the attention-span of the chairs. This would be similar to how the 
QWERTY keyboard directed the pace of typewriting. Interactions in the 
Bre[a]king Making society would be conducted differently. We can, of course, 
just speculate on the social implications in this world free from long and 
tedious meetings. One thing is for sure—academia would not look the same.  
 
 
 
This leads us to the last of our three concepts, Latour’s actants. Latour’s 
argument is that in socio-technical systems (networks) the difference between 
living bodies and inert objects are, if not non-existent at least, unimportant. 
Interaction follows similar principles regardless of whether it is between 
human and human, human and non-human, or non-human and non-human. 
Humans and non-humans only differ in what role they are given (made) in the 
network in which they are active. Therefore, Latour described them in the 
same terms –actants. Latour sees social acts propelled by statements formed by 
the actants (humans and non-humans). A statement is, in Latour’s terminology: 
“anything that is thrown, sent, or delegated by an enunciator”108 and it can 
                                                 
108 Latour, Sociology of Monsters, 106. 
Figure 51.  
Conceptual Drawing of 
the Bre[a]king Making 
Chair.  
 
Figure 52. 
Prototyping, the 
Bre[a]king Making Chair 
in pieces. 
 
Figure 53. 
The Bre[a]king Making 
Chair as exhibited in the 
Faculty Focus Show at 
Virginia Commonwealth 
University in Qatar.   
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take the form of “words, objects, apparatus or institutions.” 109 The form the 
sender of a statement uses is of little or no importance; what counts is the 
urgency by which a statement is sent. For example, the statement sent by a 
chair breaking apart underneath you is quite urgent, therefore you will stand 
up. In the method of the design narrative we can predict how different actants 
would carry different statements. 
 
 
 
In the work with the entrance to Platå Bar,110 we played with the whos and the 
whats making statements in the network (figure 54 and 55). We found that 
statements previously carried out by a doorman/guard (human) could be 
incorporated in the physical environment (non-human). The lounge bar had to 
be pushed rather close to the ingress due to space requirements. This gave us a 
rather problematic bottleneck in the design. The entrance to a nightclub 
constitutes a rather complex set of social interactions with the space. A 
potential buildup here would block the circulation and create a chaotic and 
somewhat hostile environment. We could, of course, have used a doorman to 
usher people away from the area. That, we believed, would just have created a 
similar hostile atmosphere to the one we were trying to avoid. The solution 
was to let a non-human convey the statement instead. As it is now, you enter 
Platå through a narrow tube made with two sides of glass. As you pass the 
                                                 
109 Ibid. 
110 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, Platå Bar.” 
Figure 54.  
The entrance to Platå 
Bar, Phase one, 
Linkoping Sweden in 
2000.   
 
Figure 55. 
Diagrammatic plan of the  
entrance to Platå Bar.  
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tunnel you are confronted with the curved glass front of the bar. We found out 
that people are unwilling to face this glass front for any long period of time; 
the pattern is instead to move on into the room and turn on either side of the 
bar. This way the body enters sideways through the entrance. Does it work? 
Even when Platå is filled to capacity—1000 guests—the area just in front of 
the bar is usually quite empty. 
 
As already mentioned, this little anecdotal expose´ cannot, of course, do justice 
to the scope of these concepts—that was never the intention. However, it gave 
us an insight into the fuzzy zone between [wo]man and his/her surroundings. 
The meme, media and actants, all illustrate how objects and bodies can be thought 
of as amalgamated together, as systems or hybrids—how the stuff and stuff we 
live by, so to speak, also live by us. Furthermore, the three theories all operate 
within the previously discussed definition of makings by which I situate my 
praxis— makings as transmissions of statements. The process of makings of 
makings is a process where something gets packed-sent/received-unpacked. 
McLuhan’s media cracks this conversation wide open by understanding the 
whole structure of the made, corporeal and mental, as part of conveyed 
transmissions, the made is the message. The meme follows a similar trajectory; 
replication is possible through the act of imitation. 111 Dawkins is talking of 
imitation in a broad sense. We have previously suggested three channels, in 
which we can see makings transmitted, imitation made possible—objecticity, 
textuality, and sensomobility. Finally, this multichannel transmission can, in a 
network, be carried out by humans as well as non-humans. This model of 
thinking permits us to discuss how transmissions are made.  
 
However, as a designer I also found it useful to conjecture about underlying 
mechanics of why we make:  
 what psychological structures permit us to make? 
 what propels makings of makings ? 
 
                                                 
111 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 192. 
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I have found these questions relevant for all my roles as a designer, as a 
maker, and as a researcher; however, the question get even more relevant 
when my design praxis veers towards education—makings of makers of 
makings. In the next segment I attempt to refine, distill, and dissect these 
questions from the eyes of a maker. 
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Senders without Recipients  
A good friend once asked me after viewing some of my artwork, “Why do you 
paint?” This was not the first time I had been asked that question. However, 
given that my friend is a sociologist, I interpreted his inquiry to go beyond why 
I paint, to the question of, why do we (we as individuals and societies) make art 
in the first place. We may expand this question to encompass almost all of 
mankind. We can—without spending too much time to define what it really 
is—understand art as a manifestation of human creativity. Similar to makings 
being ubiquitous, so does art appear to be an outlet for human creativity which 
permeates all of human life. Everybody might not think of themselves as 
artists; /however, I have yet to come across someone who has not expressed 
some artistic attempt: a shelf of memorabilia ordered into an imaginative 
display; carefully chosen framed pictures; a photo on a mantelpiece; a flower 
arrangement; or a veritable but often forgotten portfolio of paintings, 
sculptures, and deigns made as a child. Picasso expressed this as, “Every child 
is born an artist. The trouble is how to stay one as you grow up” and German 
sculptor, Joseph Beuys, repeatedly stated that, “Everyone is an artist.”  
 
So, “Why do we make art?” seems to be a brilliant question for research like this. 
Art is an expression of making that seems to be detached from the necessities 
and survival functions connected with the previously mentioned makings. 
Therefore, this is a question that goes beyond the surface to the fundamental 
soul of a human-made creation—why do we make at all? Nevertheless, I am not 
going to answer this question (at least not completely). I am, however, going to 
spend some energy on answering why I cannot answer it; in doing so, I hope 
we can shed some light on the subject matter. If we still see makings and 
knowledge interlinked, we also need to understand art as a system of 
knowledge. So, what kind of knowledge is human creativity? To be able to 
discuss this further let us define a specific creative act. For this purpose, graffiti 
will work nicely. Graffiti—the art of writing, carving or shaping a tag or a 
name over and over again. 
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A memory: 
When I was eight I carved my name, JOHAN, with uppercase letters into my new school 
chair. This act was inspired by a television show, a documentary about the Swedish poet and 
singer songwriter, Evert Taube. The reporter followed in the now dead poet’s footsteps. I 
remember the reporter’s excitement when he was able to track the young Evert’s writing in the 
form of graffiti at his old elementary school.  I was therefore very surprised when I was called 
in to have a serious talk with my headmaster about my, in my boyish belief, not only 
acceptable but admirable achievement.  
 
The fascinating aspect of graffiti is that almost all of us have done it— “everyone 
is an artist” —at least once, in one form or another. Maybe not with a spray can 
on a public wall, but as doodles in a book or a newspaper; as carvings into the 
bark of a tree, bench or a rock; as scribbles with chalk on a pavement; or as 
writings in the sand on the beach. Furthermore, we have done this act without 
thinking too much about why we do it. A good friend who works as a teacher 
in a secondary school in Montreal, Canada told me this story:  
 
“I was supervising three girls in detention. This was a silent detention, an hour in which the 
pupils were told to do absolutely nothing. They were not allowed to read, text, talk or 
communicate through any means with each other or anybody else, and were not given any task 
to complete. After the completed hour, the three girls left, leaving behind three decorated school 
desks. Two of the girls had neatly fashioned their own names with threads taken from their 
school uniform. The third girl had, with the same technique, simply spelled out the word 
DETENTION.”  
 
These girls, deprived of any tools other than the threads from their own 
clothes, succeeded in transmitting. The question is: to whom were these messages 
sent? 
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Graffiti can be found in prehistoric sites. There are Roman and Greek graffiti 
on Egyptian monuments, and we find Viking runes in Hagia Sofia in Istanbul. 
Graffiti is not new. What is new is that the spray can has altered the outcome 
of the graffiti size-vice. Or as the graffiti artist Banksy expresses it, “Speak 
softly, but carry a big can of paint.” 112That graffiti is important to us is 
reflected in the fierce ongoing debate about the art form. There is a 
multibillion dollar industry put on its feet just to fight graffiti. The Swedish 
Minister of Culture, Lena Adelsohn Liljeroth, has motioned to legislate against 
graffiti products (spray cans) being sold to and owned by persons under 18 
years of age.  She believes that graffiti (the art form itself) is a gateway leading 
to serious criminal behaviors.113 Make no mistake, her proposal is not only an 
attempt to diminish the destruction of properties, caused by graffiti, but it is 
directed squarely at the art form itself. Her legislative attempts do not end with 
the distribution of spray cans. She also wants to ban all the initiatives of legal 
public graffiti walls. Liljeroth is not alone.   
 
the people who run our cities don’t understand graffiti because they 
think nothing has the right to exist unless it makes a profit... the people 
who truly deface our neighborhoods are the companies that scrawl 
giant slogans across buildings and buses trying to make us feel 
                                                 
112 Banksy, Wall and Piece, 22. 
113 “Kulturminister vill ha hårda tag mot graffiti” article: Sydsvenskan, published 24 oktober 2006 
Figure 56.  
Graffiti in Rio de Janeiro   
 
Figure 57. 
Graffiti in Rome 
 
Figure 58. 
Graffiti in Rio de Janeiro   
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inadequate unless we buy their stuff.... any advertisement in public 
space that gives you no choice whether you see it or not is yours…  
(Banksy, Wall and Piece, 8.) 
 
We are truly living in the paradigm of economics. Today everything, from time to 
body parts, has to be price tagged and made into commodities in order to be 
properly explained and understood. In this paradigm, individual as well as 
social success is measured by economic means such as income, gain, assets, 
Gross National Product and treasure. The current discussions about royalties 
and patterns are good examples of how this economocentric view influences the 
thinking about making. In this view, it is the expectation of a future gain that 
propels the work of writers, artists, and inventors. This gain is often seen as 
direct, individual and monetary. Sometimes the monetary gain can be 
exchanged for fame; i.e. we make to be famous. There are political, 
commercial and religious graffiti tags, like the Nike Swoosh, the Christian 
cross, and the infamous Nazi German swastika, which might fit this 
economocentric viewpoint. These transmissions appear to have both a sender and 
a receiver in addition to a well-defined concept of messages and meaning. On 
the other hand, the lion’s share of graffiti seems to lack a clear attempt to 
convey messages or meaning; the textuality of the tag does not extend beyond 
the sender. When we try to apply current marketing theories to these types of 
graffiti, we meet resistance. The act simply seems to defy the logic of 
economics. Particularly, two aspects make graffiti difficult to place within 
prevailing market theories: 
 
 the lack of a clear receiver  
 the lack of a clear gain 
 
Both of these challenge important laws of marketing and commercialism. This 
makes the bulk of graffiti an oddity indeed. There is very little monetary gain 
involved in the act of graffiti. Graffiti is not for sale and the artists never, with 
few exceptions, get paid for their hours of work. Furthermore, since the artist 
in most cases is and wants to be anonymous, the latter gain does not apply 
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either. As makings, as transmissions, the main part of graffiti must be seen as 
being driven by other mechanisms. So the question is, what are these 
mechanisms? What drives us to spend energy and time to make transmissions, 
such as writings on a wall, in the sand, in math books, or on a school chair?  
 
One way we can see the transmission of graffiti is as an internal loop; a 
message sent back to the sender: I was here, I exist. As such we see graffiti as an 
act of marking a territory. The aspect of a territorial marker might be the fuel 
of the fierce debate mentioned above. Lena Adelsohn Liljeroth’s, strong 
reaction and the strong reactions of others like her, are then merely territorial 
disputes—which flocks (tribes, gangs) are allowed to roam the city. The same 
forces that propagate against graffiti are usually enthusiastic at the thought of 
our cities being spray-canned with advertisements and commercial messages, 
legal tagging. However, to understand graffiti as proof of  one’s existence, or 
an act of peeing in one’s territory, just explain the human reaction to graffiti 
without explaining the underlying rationale of the act.  
 
We are back to the initial question: “Why do we make art?” Maybe the answer 
is, we do it because we can’t not do it. Can the human creativity that lets (forces) us 
do art be preset? Art has, for many people come to stand for almost the whole 
concept of culture—culture is art, art is culture. Art as instinct, therefore, 
seems to defy common sense. It is as if we can accept that a lot of our 
behaviors stem from instinct, except the making of art. Art has always been 
held as one of the flagships of culture that has distinguished man from beast in 
the dichotomy of culture/nature. “We are humans because we make art.” However, 
to understand the ability to make art as a kind of hardwired readiness, an 
instinct, does not necessarily make art in itself less interesting. It is not any 
stranger than thinking of language as an instinct. Similar to what we already 
have stated above: “We are not born with Swedish, English, Swahili or Latin; 
nevertheless, we are born with the ability to learn Swedish, English, Swahili or Latin.” We 
are born with the ability to make art, which explains why we find expressions 
of human creativity everywhere we find humans. The form it takes, such as 
language, depends on which society fostered it. In the previous section, we 
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understood the transmission of making as a diagram where the transmission 
of a message takes place on the vertical axis filtered through the techniques and 
technology media on the horizontal axis. The horizontal axis of the modern 
graffiti tag media is compiled of spray cans and blank walls, as well as 
previously produced graffiti tags. 
 
 
 
In Summer 2010, I fulfilled a lifelong dream. Through a generous grant, I had 
the opportunity to travel to Rapa Nui—Easter Island. This little speck of land 
mass off the coast of Chile in the Pacific Ocean is the most remote landmass 
in the world that hosts human life. Surrounded by sea on all sides, it is truly 
the Belly of the World. Rapa Nui was populated circa 400-1200 AD by 
Polynesian seafarers who established a flourishing Stone Age society on the 
island. This society developed a devotion to art, to sculpture(figure 59 and 60). 
With limited resources for tools and limited raw materials, the people of Rapa 
Nui built more than 300 huge stone platforms, Ahu, around the island. 
Additionally they erected more than 700 huge sculptures, Moai, the famous 
Easter Island heads. This achievement is, of course, astonishing. Walking 
around these fantastic sites of artistic achievement, it is easy to understand why 
they have been so alluring to human fantasy. A quick scan on the internet 
shows numerous explanations for the Easter Island heads, each one stranger 
than the other, from extraterrestrial life forms to mystical superhumans. 
However, the manifestations of the Easter Island societies are not that unique; 
we find this need for some sort of structured transmission in almost every 
Figure 59.  
The author in front of Ahu 
Tongariki, Rapa Nui—
Easter Island. 
 
Figure 60. 
Moai at Ahu Tahai, Rapa 
Nui—Easter Island.   
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society. What differs seems to be the media through which the society 
transmits. On an individual level, the numbers of hours spent building, 
maintaining and interacting with the transmission in the Moai cult might not be 
more than how we maintain similar transmissions in our society. The averages 
hours spent on computers, iPads, and cell phones in today’s society is similar 
to the average time spent by the Easter Islanders during the heyday of the 
Moai.  
 
So what does this gives us? The need to transmit, regardless of whether there is 
a receiver or not, seems to be a human preset condition. In a social 
evolutionary perspective it makes sense. Societies that have inherent desires to 
transmit—albeit if it is only as trivial as carving one’s name in a school chair—
also have opportunities to receive. This guarantees a social knowledge 
transference, a teaching/learning, over time, space and generations. I believe 
that this aspect of creativity—transmitting without a recipient—goes beyond 
the act of graffiti. It is this urge that drives us to transform, to alter, to change 
technologies as well as techniques. Economy is an important tool in 
understanding outcomes rather than underlying forces. However, I believe in 
the principles of Homo Traditum114—man the sender, rather than in the forces of 
economy that propel makings in general. This becomes even clearer when we 
shift focus from the sender/writer/designer to the receiver/reader/user. 
 
A thought: Luckily, both Evert Taube and I were spared the lives of criminality with 
which Lena Adelsohn Liljeroth would freight us. If you are passing the small Swedish town 
Köping and visit Elund’s Primary School there is a chance that you still can find JOHAN 
clumsily carved into an old chair.  
 
 
  
                                                 
114 “Latin Dictionary.” Traditum surrender, hand over, transmit, teach 
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Receivers without Senders  
  
I know a couple of star constellations. I can, for example, identify Big Bear 
(Ursa Major), the Belt of Orion and the Southern Cross. However, for people 
from other societies, for example a Greek in 500 BC, the night sky was a 
formidable storyboard, a storyboard where the history of the world was  on 
display. Deities, heroes, and villains were forever frozen into constellations in 
the night sky. What I know now, which was unknown to the Greek sailor, is 
that the stars in a constellation, although they can be read together as a pattern 
on a relatively flat surface, just appear to have proximity. In reality, stars that 
seem to be neighbors can exist thousands of light years apart. In fact, some of 
the visible stars might no longer exist, and what we perceive is just light sent 
out a long time ago. If graffiti could be seen as sending signs without any 
receiver, the concept of star constellations can be seen as a receiver without a 
sender. The paleontologist and writer, Stephen Jay Gould, points out that:: 
“We are storytelling creatures and should have been named Homo narrator … 
rather than the often inappropriate Homo sapiens. The narrative mode comes 
naturally to us as a style for organizing our thoughts and ideas.”115  
 
As much as we are born makers, we are also born narrators, and as such we 
cannot but make sense. Here we should not confuse the word sense to mean 
truth or reality. Sense just means the way in which we order and classify the 
world—the way we reason. The ability to create narratives helps us navigate a 
complex world by finding relationships, connections and hierarchies between 
objects and phenomena.  
 
Sometimes these relationships and hierarchies are valid, such as when a hunter 
by means of small alterations of nature finds prey; sometimes it leads us to find 
god in tealeaves. We are prone to see patterns, sometimes where there are no 
patterns at all. In 1877, Giovanni Schiaparelli, an Italian astronomer, declared 
that he had found canals on the surface of the planet Mars. This observation 
                                                 
115 Gould, “So Near and Yet so Far,” 26. 
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would later be taken on by the American astronomer, Percival Lowell, who 
developed a theory that the straight lines he and Shiaparelli claimed to have 
observed were an intricate irrigation system built by an intelligent life form and 
used to distribute water from Mars’s snowcapped poles to the arid areas 
around its equator. The problem here was that the network of lines they saw 
was an illusion. What the scientists had interpreted as straight lines turned out 
to be rather irregular geological formations. Obscured by the Martian 
atmosphere, these were read together as straight lines.116 For better or worse, 
we have an analytical brain, a reasoning brain, a brain that makes sense of 
transmissions regardless of whether  they have a designated sender or not.  
 
We understand makings in general by models or metaphors based on other 
makings. This principle we find in explanations of particular formations and 
phenomena. When I was a kid my grandmother told me this story: The Giant 
could not stand the Köping church’s bells (Köping is my Swedish home town). In order to 
silence the terrible noise he filled a big sack of sand and started to walk towards the noise. 
Unfortunately he failed to see a little hole in the bag and as he walked the sand slowly seeped 
out and when he was almost there he noticed that his bag was almost empty. In anger he 
threw the rest of the sand in a big pile. 
 
This story was aimed at explaining Ströböhög, a Bronze Age burial mound that 
rests on top of Köpingsåsen, a natural Ice Age ridge that runs from north to 
south crossing the town. Of course, when my granny told me this story she 
already knew the alternative scientific explanation for both formations—the 
burial ground and the glacial river deposit site. The myth had however, 
survived through the generations. This story amalgamates nature’s creation 
with the man-made into a mythological making building on such a mundane 
metaphoric activator as a leaking sack. Makings aid our understanding of the 
world. The view of the universe as a clockwork reflects a society of clock 
makers: the hammer of thunder of the Norse god, Thor, reflects a society of 
blacksmithing and the first man made out of clay reflects a society of potters. 
                                                 
116 Norretranders, The User Illusion, 376–77. 
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Our cognition of the world is partly based on the made, and the principle of 
making forms cognitive models—models by which we perceive other 
makings. 
 
Furthermore, part of the making sense is, to make a sender of, as well as attach 
intention to, transmissions. The heroes and gods of the night sky, and giants 
with their sacks, are illustrations of narrative projections. These projections 
allow us to humanize phenomenon, give them body and life and make them 
into our image. There is almost no limit to what can be made alive. One of my 
favorite superheroes as a child, DC Comic’s Wildfire, was pure antimatter in a 
human form. Elaine Scarry outlines this phenomenon of projection in three 
ways: 
 
1. As a direct understanding of phenomena as body parts; i.e. windows as 
eyes (from the old Nordic word vindauga wind+eye) or clothing as a 
second skin. 
2. As an understanding of phenomena as a function or a need of the 
body; i.e. (in Scarry’s own words) “The printing press, the 
institutionalized convention of written history, photographs, libraries, 
film, tape recordings, and Xerox machines are all materializations of 
the elusive embodied capacity for memory, rather than materializations 
of, for example, one cubic inch of brain matter located above the left 
ear.” 117 
3. As a desire to project awareness into the inanimate. 
 
This third category of projection is of interest to us here as it really shows the 
ability to attach (make) a sender to messages—verbal and nonverbal—
regardless of whether the transmission is intentional or not.   
 
…it is part of the work of creating to deprive the external world of the 
privilege of being inanimate—of, in other words, its privilege of being 
                                                 
117 Scarry, The Body in Pain, 283. 
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irresponsible to its sentient inhabitants on the basis that it is itself non-
sentient. To say that the ‘inanimateness’ of the external world is 
diminished, is almost to say (but is not to say) that the external world is 
made animate  (Scarry, The Body in Pain, 285.) 
 
Making sense of objects is to give them intentions, as if they were alive; as a 
part of this we give objects humanlike names, such as ships and hurricanes. 
Arlene, Bret, Cindy, Don, Emily, Franklin, Gert, Harvey, Irene, Jose, Katia, 
Lee, Maria, Nate, Ophelia, Philippe, Rina, Sean, Tammy, Vince and Whitney 
are the names given to the predicted hurricanes in 2011.118 One of my friends 
worked in a place where all the tools had the prefix Mr., such as Mr. Stapler 
and Mr. Densitometer. Given that the phenomenon is reversible—we project 
the body onto the made and we project the made onto our body119—we have 
a social interaction with the world of objects. Such a social interaction can 
manifest itself in human feelings towards non-humans, for example anger 
towards malfunctioning tools. Hammers, computers, cars are not only seen as 
alive, but are held responsible for their conduct. The breakdown of tools is 
taken as direct insubordination. Basil (John Cleese’s character in the TV series 
Fawlty Towers) talks, threatens and finally spanks his car with a wood branch, as 
if its refusal to work is an active and malicious behavior (figure 61).120 In the 
society of stuff and stuff, we form strong mental, emotional, sentimental bonds 
to objects—in some cases even, paraphilias, sexual arousal. 
 
                                                 
118 “National Hurricane Center.” 
119 his fist came down as a hammer, I got a syntax error (computer jargon) the ghost in the machine, he’s got 
fire in his belly 
120 Davis, “Fawlty Towers.” 
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The made-alive-world is a fertile soil for mythological creatures where fusions 
of technology and body are made pregnant. Centaurs, pans, cyborgs, half man-
half machine (Robocop) (figure 62), machines and objects with human 
consciences (Chitty Chitty Bang Bang, Christine, Terminator, the haunted 
house), werewolves (half man-half wolf), vampires (half man-half bat), and the 
already mentioned Wildfire (half man-half antimatter) are mythical hybrid 
creatures that have and still are populating our stories and myths. This 
hybridization shows traces of very important cognitive processes, in which 
objecticity and sensomobility melt together into one unit of cognition. This is 
the process by which technology gives birth to technique; techniques give 
birth to technology; and media shapes us. 
 
  
Figure 61.  
"Come on, start, will 
you!? Start, you vicious 
bastard!! Come on! Oh 
my God! I'm warning you 
— if you don't start… I'll 
count to three. 
One…two…three…!! 
Right! That's it! You've 
tried it on just once too 
often! Right! Well, don't 
say I haven't warned you! 
I've laid it on the line to 
you time and time again! 
Right! Well…this is it! I'm 
going to give you a damn 
good thrashing!".  (Davis, 
“Fawlty Towers.”) 
 
Figure 62. 
Cyborg 
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We Are What We Make, and We Make Constantly  
 
This leads us to a remarkable conclusion: we are what we make or rather we 
understand the world through our makings. These statements are of course based 
on guesswork—hypothesis. However, I think we have some strong indications 
pointing towards the relevance of this guesswork. In the argument I am 
making I refer to authorities from the disciplines of psychology, neurology, 
philosophy, linguistics and, of course, from the made world. It is after all, a 
theory through design we are trying to formulate. The sentence: We understand 
our world through our makings can be also be expressed as, we are making our 
understanding—we make sense. As already mentioned, we are far from unique in 
the animal kingdom by utilizing an external track of making. However, the 
makings of birds, corals, beavers, hornets, ants, termites, otters and even our 
closest primate relative, the chimpanzee, differ in some important aspects from 
the makings of humans.  No other species makes in the plentitude and with 
the impact that humans do, and no other species is so dependent on makings. 
The sheer mass and multitude of how we shape our world makes us unique 
indeed. This, our unique ability to make, is generally believed to be based on 
our ability to form complex language structures. The hierarchy of these two 
abilities is often given so that first comes language, then comes making; 
making is thereby seen as subordinate.  
 
In its most extreme form—Linguistic Determinism—language is believed to 
control the very way we think. As described by Linguistic Determinism—also 
known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis or Whorfianism which as a theory 
argues that thoughts are determined by the language we speak—English is a 
more technical language and French is a more philosophical language and so 
on. Linguistic Determinism claims that the structure of a language affects the 
ways in which its speakers are able to conceptualize their world. One of the 
most rehashed proofs for this theory is the American amateur linguist, 
Benjamin Whorf's claim that the Inuit language has more words for snow than 
most other languages. Whorf’s initial word count, seven, was published in the 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s promotional magazine, Technology 
Review, in 1940.121 To start with, it seems that Whorf was a little off in his 
counting. Furthermore, the number has since been inflated and inserted into 
common knowledge through a process that more resembles the kid’s game, 
telephone, rather than serious research. The American anthropologist, Laura 
Martin, has found word counts up to 200.122 From my upbringing I remember 
a succession of school teachers time after time stating staggering numbers of 
snow words in the language of the Inuit. A similar claim was repeated in a 
dialogue I had with a friend just a couple of months ago. However, even if the 
Inuit have more words for snow than, say, people living in the Qatari desert, 
does that prove that this knowledge is linguistically determined? Doesn’t it just 
show that snow and the qualities of snow are important to the Inuit society, 
and that the cognitive apparatus has adjusted to the constant makings of a 
snow nomadic life? 
 
Our ability to form complex language and our ability to make are related and 
connected for sure; however, I believe that the hierarchy can be debated. As 
we have seen, a lot of the structure used in the act of tool usage is 
subconscious and non-verbal. For example, the cognitive foundation of acts 
like playing tennis, biking or snowboarding cannot be communicated as 
linguistic structures. The relationship is better formulated if we understand the 
two abilities (making and language) utilizing similar cognitive structures. What 
does such a model of thinking give us? I think it benefits us in three ways. 
First, it bypasses the marshland of Linguistic Determinism. Second, even if we 
do not accept a strict dominant/subordinate relationship, we do not have to 
sever the links completely. In many respects, we can see language reflecting, 
rather that constituting the cognitive process, of making. With a healthy 
skepticism, the operational use of language and language structures become 
good peepholes into cognitive structures. Third, this structure levels the 
                                                 
121 Pullum, The Great Eskimo Vocabulary Hoax and Other Irreverent Essays on the Study of Language, 163. 
122 Martin, “‘Eskimo Words for Snow’: A Case Study in the Genesis and Decay of an Anthropological Example,” 
420. 
133 
 
playing field for makings by object, makings by body and makings by language, one of 
the goals for our theory through design. All this is easy to say, but how does it 
work? 
 
The mental translation, discussed in Part I, that stems out of tool usage is 
partly non-verbal. Holding a hammer, a remote control or a cane, or driving a 
car, changes our perception of the world. Just think how different your 
perception is crossing a road on foot or passing the same crossing while 
driving a big car. These types of translations are built around cognitive 
structures that enable us to construe verbal and non-verbal imaginative 
simulations of causalities: with the hammer in my hand I am able to break that wall; 
driving the car I have a strong, fast and hard body. On a verbal level, these simulations 
might be called narrative. However, the underlying cognitive structures of 
imagination that enable us to form narratives operate on the non-verbal level, 
too. Studies of cognitive structures in higher primates might cast some light on 
this phenomenon. The American cognitive biologist, Daniel Povinelli, argued 
that the human ability to understand cause and effect in the physical world 
differs fundamentally from other higher primates.’123 Povinelli has, through a 
series of cognitive experiments, tested apes’ ability to solve what he calls folk 
physic tasks—causality problems—conceptually rather than through a process 
of trial and error. Povinelli’s experiments contain ingredients of sensory-motor 
tool usage puzzles, testing the ability to understand differences between, for 
example:  
 
 rigid and flimsy tools of the same shape;  
 tools of the same material that differ in shape; and 
 connected or non-connected objects.  
 
In these tests the chimpanzees show little or no understanding of the active 
part of the object—the objecticity—if it is not directly detectable. The 
experiments show how humans to a high degree conceptualize abstract 
                                                 
123 Povinelli, Folk Physics for Apes. 
134 
 
physicality of phenomena, such as balance, gravity, weight, etc., in order to 
predict outcomes. “[B]y a very early age, children actively use a variety of rules 
to infer cause and effect, and exhibit structured ways of selecting amongst 
them.”124 The rock (discussed in Part I) translates to something—a hammer, 
an ax and a weapon—in the recognition that it responded to a causal 
(objecticitive and sensomobilitive) relationship.  
 
However, can we find more evidence for this causal cognition? Can we find 
other evidence for how makings constitute our understanding? I believe we 
can. When Steven Pinker describes what he calls the language of thought he does 
not talk about a verbal language— “…people do not think in English or 
Chinese or Apache”125 but “…the internal representation is the imagination.” 
Through a study of usages of verbs—the action word of a sentence—Pinker 
unearthed parts of this imaginative cognitive structure. “The verb, then, is not 
just a word that refers to an action or a state, but the chassis of the sentence. It 
is the framework which is the receptacle for other parts—the subject, the 
object, and various oblique objects and subordinate clauses—to be bolted 
on.”126The fact that the verb is so important for how we construct (make) 
sense in language is in itself interesting. We are indeed active bodies that we 
understand the world as an active construct. Pinker asks simple questions such 
as why the English language accepts:  
 “Load hay onto the wagon” and “load the wagon with hay”; however, 
while you can say “toss hay onto the wagon,” you cannot say “toss the 
wagon with hay”? 
 “Bring the cat to our mother” and “bring our mother the cat”; 
however, while you can say  “drive the bus to the lake,” you cannot say 
“drive the lake the bus”? 
                                                 
124 Ibid., 88. 
125 Pinker, The Language Instinct, 72. 
126 Pinker, The Stuff of Thought, 30. 
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 “The egg boiled” and “Bobby boiled the eggs”; however, while you can 
say “the baby is crying,” you cannot say “the thunder is crying the 
baby”? 
 “Hit the wall with a stick” and “hit the stick against the wall”; however, 
while you can say “touch something with your hand,” you cannot say 
“touch the hand against something”? 
 
Verb constructions seem to reflect a cognitive process that operates from the 
causalities implied by the sentences. There is a difference between “to fill” and 
“to spray.” Although both acts can be understood as moving a liquid, there is a 
significant distinction in how the liquid is moved and what affect it has. I do 
not like to have my glass sprayed with beer, but rather filled with it. Verb 
constructs show the capacity of our imagination to turn on and off abilities of 
objects (its objecticity). In English, verbs cluster into micro classes related to 
the actants and the acts. Are objects in motion or standing still; requiring 
contact; causing effects on each other directly or indirectly; etc. However, 
different languages have different ways to make these constructs. 
 
This indicates, similar to what Povinelli argues, that there is a cognitive 
apparatus that operates with a strong comprehension of causality. That verb 
constructs are sensitive to abstract concepts of time, place, pace, gravity, and 
materiality govern the world of stuff and stuff. 
 
The cognitive linguist, George Lakoff, and the philosopher, Mark Johnson, 
argue similar cognitive structures, “We have found… that metaphor is 
pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our 
ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is 
fundamentally metaphorical in nature.” 127 Metaphors are used daily and often 
without us reflecting or even comprehending them as metaphors. In sentences 
such as “that was a cutting remark”; “he’s seeking his fortune”; and “I can’t take 
my eyes off her”; ideas are cutting instruments; wealth is a hidden object; and 
                                                 
127 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 3. 
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seeing is touching.128 Furthermore, we find indication that our experiences and 
our makings build up metaphorical cognitive patterns in which we understand 
different acts of makings correlating regardless if man or nature is the cause 
of the changes of the objects. I made the clay, the paper, glass into a statue, a 
plane or a vase; the water, the mountain turned, the star turned into ice, a 
volcano, a supernova. Our cognitive processes acknowledge changes of phase 
as a making as when water turns into ice. “[R]easoning in abstract domains 
uses the logic of our sensory-motor experiences. For example, if something 
rises physically, it is higher than it was before. If the price of something “rises” 
(metaphorically), then it is higher (metaphorically) than it was before.”129 The 
world is made by our actions. In this light connections and transference 
between technology and technique discussed in Part II become easier to grasp.  
 
If we go back to the design laboratory Platå, I believe we can comprehend the 
behavior of the people entering the nightclub through the world of glass from 
such causal cognitive structures. The courtesy shown in the entrance stems from 
a causal understanding—we are soft and weak bodies in a hard and sharp 
world—glass is easily broken and broken glass can penetrate our soft skin—a 
narrative-like understanding on an almost completely subconscious level. The 
construe of the world is built on multiple ongoing causal simulations. As we 
move in the world, these simulations allow us to activate and deactivate objects 
and bodies around us. Thus, we are in a constant mood of (mentally or 
imaginary) making. This imaginary making enables us to interact 
psychologically, as well as physically, with our surroundings in more than one 
way.  
 
“[H]umans may have been left in the philosophically awkward position 
of having multi psychological causes for the same behavior—only some 
of which penetrate into the highest level of our conscious experience. 
Indeed we suspect that most of the ancient psychological mechanisms 
                                                 
128 Ibid., 46–51. 
129 Ibid., 248. 
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which drives our moment-to-moment behaviors do not intrude into 
our reflective conscious experience, and therefore we are frequently left 
to miss-diagnose the psychological causes for our behaviors (Povinelli, 
Folk Physics for Apes, 65.) 
 
That the materiality of glass—the objecticity—can evoke behaviors goes back 
to the phenomenon of inherent knowledge in object discussed briefly in Part I, 
and the definition of knowledge to include the know-how as well as the know-of. 
In a broad definition, we have seen knowledge transmitted though three 
different channels—genetic transmission (sensomobility), linguistic structures 
(textuality), and through activation of object (objecticity). Design often just 
deals with the two latter types of transmissions. Objecticity is a powerful 
channel to transmit knowledge in the form of know-how, whereas knowledge 
transmitted via textuality, by definition, leans more towards know-of. We know 
the world by making it, constantly moment-to-moment, projecting our bodies 
into objects and objects into our body. The behavior when entering Platå is 
governed by a causal imagination If I lean on the glass it is going to crack, if it cracks I 
might cut myself—a making. In that is has been made, been designed, it is a 
making of a making or a know-making. 
 
We find some small clues for a connection between “to know” and “to make” 
in my native tongue. In Swedish, the word for knowledge kunskap, is a 
combined word built up from kund- and -skap. The former kund- stems from 
the same root as kunna 130(be able, know, sensing) similar to the English word 
can (from an Anglo-Saxon origin cunnan) and the German word kennen. The 
oldest form, gno-, goes back to Proto-Indo-European. Not surprisingly gno- is 
also the origin of the English word know. The second part, -skap, 131 has two 
plausible origins. Both are very appetizing for our argument. The first plausible 
origin stems from the same root as the Swedish verb skapa (create, make). The 
most likely meaning, however, is rather the noun be-skaffen-het (state, condition). 
                                                 
130 Hellquist, “Svensk Etymologisk Ordbok,” 368. 
131 Ibid., 728. 
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In this form the word has found its English meaning in the word shape. Yet the 
noun takes its root from the German verb be-shaffen (create, make). Thus the 
Swedish construe acknowledges the formation of knowledge as an act of 
making—know-making. Furthermore, the similar root for know and can, 
indicates the relationship between know and be able to.  
 
Entering Platå we, as bodies, are, mentally, able to break the glass and cut 
ourselves, projecting the body into the world around us. In the words of the 
French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre, “My body is everywhere: the bomb that 
destroys my house also damages my body in so far the house was already an 
indication of my body. This is why the body always extends across the tool 
which it utilizes: it is at the end of the cane on which I lean and against the 
earth; it is at the end of the telescope which shows me the stars; it is on the 
chair, in the whole house; for it is my adaption to these tools.”132 The power of 
this cognitive imagination is a result of an interwoven structure between body 
and its surrounding; a structure that entwines transmissions of texturality, 
objecticity and sensomobility into one plastic experience. Or as the 
philosopher, Andy Clark, put it, “the very ideas of mind and persons are not 
limited to the biological skin-bag, and that our senses of self, place, and 
potential are all malleable constructs ready to expand, change, or contract at 
surprisingly short notice.”133 This cognitive structure is active when we feel 
vertigo viewing a film; feel pain seeing a fakir penetrate his skin with huge pins; 
or turn the whole world to nails when holding a hammer in our hands. Andy 
Clark pushes the concept of projection into the stuff and stuff further. Albeit we 
do not have physical connection with our technology as do science fiction 
characters such as Robocop or Johnny Mnemonic; still Clark professes that we 
are all living cyborgs, bodies that are constantly making strong psychological 
connections with tools. The neuroscientist, Vilayanur Subramanian 
Ramachandran, explains this as, “Your own body is a phantom, one that your 
                                                 
132 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 325. 
133 Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs, 33. 
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brain has temporarily constructed purely for convenience.” 134 In the making 
of the found rock to a hammer, the body and the rock almost cease to exist as 
two separate entities. To master a tool is to make it disappear, to make it one 
with the body. The mythological hybrids, mentioned above, reflect this 
amalgamation.  
 
We can furthermore, understand this amalgamation as a new unit for thinking. 
As already discussed in part I, we are thinking through our tools: with a hammer 
in your hand, the world turns into nails. In my teaching, I attempt to harness this 
principle. I argue that design is a knowledge, understanding, of how to put 
things together in that the designer is a craftsman in the broad sense of the 
word.135 In the act of one-to-one makings (and breakings) students are given a 
chance to become one with tools in order to construct, deconstruct, 
reassemblethe world of stuff and stuff through the knowledge of power tools. 
The idea is that we are thinking through tools. Therefore, the interaction with 
the physicality of the wood workshop helps the design student not only to 
understand the craft involved with the particular making, but also to puzzle 
together the world of stuff and stuff differently. This understanding is then 
superimposed when a system of more abstract statements are put to use, 
drafting or computer modeling.  
 
In order to show that the amalgamation actually happens, Ramachandran has 
constructed small and easily conducted psycho-corporeal experiments that 
illustrate that the body projected into inanimate objects and body parts can be 
elongated on a mental plane. I have chosen to give you one of Ramachandran’s 
experiments here—the body projected into a table. The other experiments can 
be found in his book Phantoms in the Brain.136 You can easily carry them out 
yourself with a little help from your friends with about a 50% chance to 
experience some really peculiar phenomenon first hand. The body projected 
                                                 
134 Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, 58. 
135 Granberg, “The Didactic Theater, The Makings of Crafts[men].” 
136 Ramachandran and Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain, 58–9. 
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into a table is conducted this way. Hide the test subject’s hand out of sight, 
under a tabletop. Then stroke and tap the hidden hand simultaneously as you 
stroke and tap the tabletop. The stroking and taping of the tabletop must be 
fully visible to the test subject and in total sync to the motion under the 
tabletop. After about a minute there is a chance that the test subject starts to, 
against his or her intellectual belief, feel through the table as if the table was a 
part of his or her body. This experiment is far from just a cool trick. In 
measuring what is called galvanic skin response (GSR), Ramachandran137 has 
showed that the reaction is more than a shallow illusion. When Ramachandran 
hit the table made alive with a hammer, the GSR changed dramatically. This 
same reaction was as if the doctor had threatened to hit the test subject’s real 
hand. The table, or other objects, seem to be coupled to the test subject’s 
limbic system. The limbic system is an amalgam of brain structures which is 
believed to support a variety of mental functions such as emotion, behavior, 
and long term memory. “If this argument is correct, then perhaps it’s not at all 
that silly to ask whether you identify with your car. Just punch it and see if your 
GSR changes.”138 This mechanism also explains why we might feel pain when 
our tools break down. Remember the example of the broken hammer. Clark 
again states, “[O]ur brain can quite readily project feeling and sensation beyond 
the biological shell. In much the same way, the blind person’s cane or the 
sports star’s racket soon come to feel like genuine extensions of the user’s 
body and senses.”139 This might be as good an opportunity as any to end this 
exploration of our world of stuff and stuff.  
  
                                                 
137 Ibid., 61. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs, 62. 
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Observations and Continuation 
 
So what did we unearth in Part III? First, once again, we have discovered that 
design must be seen operating with an open mind towards the phenomenon of 
dichotomies. Statements are not given their relevance based on what the 
enunciator is (human or non human), but rather by what role they have been 
given in a system. This I have found to be relevant in my work as a designer in 
that I am able to choose from a wide array of enunciator transmitting 
statements when I make for others to make. Second, the dependencies and 
linkages between man and his object seem to go beyond a mere physical 
utilization. Utilization of tools forms psychological bonds. This, at least partly, 
explains how the interlinkage between technologies and technique, discussed in 
Part II, operates; and how techniques can maintain structures and ruleworks. 
As a designer—an anthropologist—I have to attempt to comprehend these 
deeper psychological linkages: how they form; how they are maintained; and 
how they deconstruct. Third, some of our cognitive structures seem to be 
prone to construct narrative. This narrative ability might be seen as structures of 
corporeal causalities and it enables us to navigate—to make, remake, and 
unmake, the complex world of stuff and stuff. Fourth, the combinations of the 
psychological linkage—between man and his object—in combination with the 
narrative side of our cognition produce an array of problems and opportunities 
in how statements are constantly translated and transformed.  
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Conclusion 
 
About three and a half years ago, I set out to do this PhD in an attempt to 
expand design discourse, and to understand my own take on design and 
making. The research has attempted to explore statements produced in 
design, makings of makings: 
 
 What statements are involved in the act of making?  
 How and why are these statements produced? 
 How and by what are these statements transmitted and maintained? 
 How and why do these statements bring together object, languages, and 
bodies as well as activities, phenomena, and ultimately societies? 
  
The exploration has through a reflection of my praxis focused on questions of 
how systems, networks, and ruleworks of objects, language, and bodies are 
held together through acts of making. The research has been conducted as a 
study of praxes as well through my praxis—my design laboratories.  
 
What can I say I have achieved; what is the viable outcome of this research? 
First, I have been able to define a terminology that better enables me to 
communicate (within) my own design practice as: a designer, a researcher, and 
an educator. The payoff is perhaps most direct and rewarding in my role as a 
teacher. I believe that the research has given me good tools to convey methods 
and concepts to my students in the design studio. Second, in the research I 
have found more sufficient ways to express statements produced in makings. 
Specifically, it has enabled me to discuss what I see as a problematic hierarchic 
relationship between linguistic and corporeal statement. Third, I have 
unearthed some of the underlying structures of how design as a transmission 
operates. This has made it possible to understand some of the operations I 
have operated by both as a craftsman and an anthropologist. I hope this has 
shed a light not only on my praxis, but also on other praxes of makings of 
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makings. Fourth, the research has allowed me to better bring together the 
elements of thinking and making to a more coherent body of work 
 
As I see this work as part of my praxis I understand it as an ongoing research 
project. In many ways the process has exposed more questions than answers. 
This is apparent in the theoretical model as well as in my eight design 
laboratories. 
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